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Humans can perform complex behavior according to the goal of the task and its 
rules, and swiftly adapt their behavior to the new rule when there is a change in 
circumstances.  How do our brains select and implement the appropriate rules? 
Cognitive control is the ability to select task-relevant information over other 
irrelevant distracting information.  The neural mechanism of cognitive control is 
typically described in terms of resolution of conflict among sensory 
representations of stimuli or among competing motor responses.  However, an 
understanding of the mechanisms by which the brain executes control over 
abstract, learned, representations of rule information has remained elusive. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether a single control mechanism governs different 
sources of conflict among task rules or whether dissociable mechanisms of 
cognitive control exist.  In this dissertation, we used functional neuroimaging and 
behavioral experiments to examine the conflict-driven cognitive control 
mechanisms in humans for resolving conflict among abstract representations of 
task rules. By using a newly devised paradigm that can directly manipulate the 
degree of conflict at the task-rule level, we found conflict among abstract 
representations of task rules was resolved by feedback from the right inferior 
frontal gyrus enhancing the activity of the brain region processing the relevant 
abstract information, rather than suppressing the activity of the brain region 
processing the irrelevant abstract information.  To examine the generality of the 
conflict-driven cognitive control mechanism, we independently manipulated the 
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levels of conflict for task switching (switch/repeat) and cue congruency 
(incongruent/congruent) using a factorial design.  We found these two sources of 
task-rule conflict recruit different brain circuits for conflict resolution.  
Furthermore, by employing a behavioral proportion manipulation (changing the 
frequency of conflict trials within a single block), we found these two sources of 
rule-related conflict respond differently to the same manipulation. These results 
support a conflict-specific cognitive control account in which qualitatively distinct 
mechanisms recruit separate neural resources to resolve each type of conflict 
independently.  Together, these findings provide a mechanistic view of how 
cognitive control of abstract rule representations is accomplished.  
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1. Chapter 1: Selection of Task-relevant Information 
 
1.1. Background and Significance 
A hallmark of human cognitive faculty is the capacity for cognitive control: the 
ability to flexibly guide our thoughts and behavior in accordance with internally 
generated goals or task rules.   This ability is particularly important when features 
of our environment simultaneously activate multiple, competing representations.  
Resolution of such conflict is thought to depend on cognitive control 
mechanisms, which bias information processing towards task-relevant 
representations over irrelevant competitors (Norman and Shallice, 1986; 
Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Miller and Cohen, 2001).   
The mechanism involved in enhancing the task-relevant information at the 
expense of the task-irrelevant information is often referred to as “selection”.   
Selection mechanisms have typically been described in the context of selecting 
relevant over irrelevant sensory information from our external world, such as 
searching for a target object among other distractors in the scene. A consistent 
finding from both neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies is that activity 
increases in the brain areas encoding the task-relevant stimulus (Moran and 
Desimone, 1985; Corbetta et al., 1991; Wojciulik et al., 1998).  Transcranial 
magnetic stimulation on prefrontal cortex in healthy human participants as well as 
studies on patients with focal prefrontal cortex damage also provide causal 
evidence that the source of the attentional modulation is likely from the prefrontal 
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cortex (Barcelo et al., 2000; Ruff et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2007; Miller et al., 
2011).   
More recently, researchers have attempted to study the mechanism for 
selection of learned, abstract information. Some examples of this type of 
selection are, goal-directed retrieval of semantic or phonological features of a 
word (Gold and Buckner, 2002), and resolving conflicting conceptual 
representations (Badre and Wagner, 2007; Snyder et al., 2007). These studies 
often show that activation of prefrontal cortex is linked to selection of relevant 
conceptual knowledge from a set of competing alternatives, and that prefrontal 
cortex co-activates with dissociable posterior regions depending on the kind of 
information being retrieved.  The similar neural pattern of activation for selection 
of perceptual (i.e. sensory) information and for selection of conceptual (i.e. 
abstract) information suggests a common selection mechanism underlying these 
two different types of information.  
Here, we are interested in the selection mechanism involved in another type 
of learned abstract representation - task rules. We define “rule” as the if-then 
function that establishes relationships among a set of stimuli and potential 
responses, where such relationships are independent of particular stimuli or 
specific motor responses involved in the task.  More specifically, the rules 
discussed here are abstract in a sense that they can be applied to familiar and 
novel situations alike (e.g. social rules), rather than being bounded by automatic 
or overlearned association between a stimulus and a response (e.g. a “red” light 
means to “stop”).  
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In recent years, several studies have indirectly tested the mechanism by 
which competing task rules were resolved by measuring changes of activity in 
brain areas that are selective for a particular task set (e.g. fusiform face area for 
gender discrimination task) under conditions in which task rules are constantly 
shifting (Yeung et al., 2006) or task performance requires conflict resolution 
(Egner and Hirsch, 2005).  However, a common problem among these studies is 
that conflict can occur at multiple levels of information processing, ranging from 
perceptual inputs, motor response, to task rules.  For example, in a typical task-
switching paradigm, a task switch not only requires selection of new task rule, but 
also selection of the relevant stimulus features and appropriate responses 
specified by the currently relevant rule. Same problem also applies to tasks 
requiring conflict resolution such as the Stroop task.  In order to successfully 
perform a Stroop color-naming task that involves a conflicting stimulus (e.g. the 
word GREEN displayed in red ink), participants need to enhance the relevant 
rule representation (color-naming task) and use it to select the relevant stimulus 
attribute (the color feature of the displayed word), and at the same time to 
resolve a pre-potent response tendency of reading the written word.  Thus, 
without being able to separate rule representations from stimulus features and 
stimulus-response associations, it remains unclear how selection among 
competing “pure” rule representations is achieved and whether there is a 
common mechanism for selection among competing sensory representations 
(e.g. perceptual stimuli) and selection among competing abstract representations 
(e.g. task rules). 
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The overarching goal of this dissertation is to use functional 
neuroimaging to illuminate the cognitive control mechanisms for resolving 
conflict between task rules.  Specifically, we want to investigate conflict 
resolution at the task-rule level, rather than having it confounded with other 
aspects of the task, such as the sensory properties of the cues or motor 
response.  
A line of research has shown that neurons in prefrontal cortex can represent 
abstract rules that are not tied to specific stimuli or responses (White and Wise, 
1999; Wallis et al., 2001; Bunge et al., 2003).  In addition, the task rule 
representations in the prefrontal cortex are thought to provide the necessary top-
down signals to bias processing in other brain structures towards the task-
relevant information (Miller and Cohen, 2001). Despite mounting empirical 
evidence supporting the theory that conflicts occurring in the perceptual, 
memory, and motor domains are resolved through prefrontal bias in favor of the 
behaviorally relevant information over other competitors, very little is yet known 
about how competition among task rules themselves are resolved. 
Answering the question regarding the selection mechanism of abstract rules 
would provide a basis for understanding higher-level cognitive processes that 
require selection of context-appropriate rules, such as planning, decision-making, 
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1.2. Literature Review: Selection from Concrete Sensory Representations 
 
 
In what follows, I first review relevant theoretical perspective and empirical 
work in the field of visual selective attention that might inform our understanding 
regarding selection of competing abstract, non-sensory, representations.  A 
central theme of this review will focus on the idea of biased competition.  I will 
present numerous neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies that implicate 
prefrontal cortex as playing a critical role in selection of task-relevant information, 
and how this selection process can be achieved. Then, I will review relevant 
literature regarding rule selection, many of which are based upon task switching, 
a widely used paradigm that studies the cognitive processes involved in retrieval 
and/or selection of a currently relevant rule and resolution of task conflicts.  A 
major goal of the current study is to examine the selection mechanism involved in 
resolving rule conflicts while controlling for other aspects of the task, such as the 
perceptual items and/or response sets associated with the rule representations.   
 
1.2.1. Biased Competition: Attention, Working Memory, and 
Prefrontal Cortex 
 
The visual system is limited in its capacity to process all visual inputs 
received at the same time.  Therefore, selection mechanisms are needed to 
direct limited processing resources to the goal-relevant aspects of our 
surroundings.  Several models have been proposed to account for how this 
attentional selection is achieved in the visual system. One classic view is that 
attention works as a mental spotlight, which enhances the responses of neurons 
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representing the behaviorally relevant stimulus in the visual field (Brefczynski and 
DeYoe, 1999).  An alternative model, termed “biased competition model” 
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995), states that attention acts as a biasing signal that 
modulates the competitive interactions among neurons representing all of the 
stimuli in the visual field.  Hence, the attentional enhancement of neurons 
representing the behaviorally relevant stimuli results in the suppression of other 
neurons representing the irrelevant stimuli.  In addition, these competitive 
interactions can be biased through both “top-down” and “bottom-up” mechanisms 
(For a review, see Desimone, 1998).  The “top-down” mechanism refers to the 
voluntary selection of stimulus that in accordance with our current goals or 
intentions (e.g. a stimulus is selected for its relevance to the current task 
requirement), whereas the bottom-up mechanism refers to the selection of 
stimulus given its salience (e.g. local inhomogeneity, sudden target onset, or 
novelty). 
Some of the strongest evidence for the biased competition model in visual 
attention comes from the single-cell recording studies in monkeys using visual 
search tasks.  In these studies, a pair of stimuli was presented simultaneously 
within the receptive field of a target neuron in visual cortex.  When attention was 
not deployed to either stimulus, the neural response was shown to be a weighted 
average of the responses elicited by each stimulus alone, suggesting the stimuli 
within the receptive field appear to engage in suppressive interactions.  When 
attention was deployed to one of the stimuli, the neural response was determined 
by the stimulus that the monkey attended to: the neuron gave a strong response 
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if the preferred stimulus for the neuron was attended, and the response was 
greatly suppressed if the non-preferred stimulus was attended (Moran and 
Desimone, 1985; Luck et al., 1997; Reynolds et al., 1999).   This pattern of 
neural activity provides strong evidence that the neural responses are modulated 
by attentional selection. 
Similar biasing effects that are found throughout visual cortex in visual 
search tasks also are found during the delay period of working memory tasks, in 
which the monkeys must hold the sample stimulus “on-line” for a couple of 
seconds in order to respond appropriately (Miller et al., 1993).  The neural 
response of an inferotemporal neuron during the delay period in the matching-to-
sample working memory task is biased to the behaviorally relevant choice 
stimulus: the neuron gives a strong response during the delay period followed by 
a preferred sample stimulus, but the response is suppressed followed by a non-
preferred sample stimulus (Fuster and Jervey, 1981; Miyashita and Chang, 1988; 
Miller and Desimone, 1994).  This similarity of biasing effects on neural activity in 
posterior sensory cortices suggests that selective attention and working memory 
share a common mechanism: neural activity is enhanced in populations of 
neurons representing behaviorally relevant visual stimuli, and inhibition occurs in 
populations of neurons representing competing stimuli by virtue of the mutually 
inhibitory interactions.  
It is commonly believed that such biasing effect on neural activity is not an 
intrinsic property of the visual cortex, but rather is derived from interactions 
between brain regions or even between neural networks.  It has been proposed 
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that the prefrontal cortex – the anterior portion of the frontal lobe that is highly 
developed in humans and primates – plays an important role in this process 
(Miller, 1999; Boller and Grafman, 2002).  In terms of anatomy, the prefrontal 
cortex has extensive reciprocal connections with virtually all sensory and motor 
systems and a wide range of subcortical structures (Barbas and Pandya, 1989; 
Cavada and Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Petrides and Pandya, 2002), which makes it 
an ideal infrastructure for receiving diverse types of information about our current 
environment and internal states.  The PFC’s extensive outputs also allow for top-
down control by providing an excitatory signal that biases processing in different 
brain systems to represent task-relevant information. 
Both neurophysiological studies in monkeys and neuroimaging studies in 
humans also support the role of prefrontal cortex in exerting top-down control.  
Cooling studies in monkeys have shown prefrontal deactivation causes IT 
neurons during both the encoding and the delay period to be less selective.  
Furthermore, prefrontal cooling was accompanied by impairment in working 
memory performance, which established a direct link between prefrontal cortex 
top-down modulation and behavioral performance (Fuster et al., 1985).  Similarly, 
microstimulation of neurons in the frontal eye fields have provided causal 
evidence that frontal cortex modulates neuronal activity in the visual cortex 
(Moore and Armstrong, 2003).  In humans, studies in patients with prefrontal 
lesions as well as studies using transcranial magnetic stimulation of frontal 
regions also provide causal evidence of prefrontal-dependent top-down 
modulation on visual cortex (Barcelo et al., 2000; Zanto et al., 2011; Lee and 
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D'Esposito, 2012).  Taken together, these findings provide neural evidence that 
the prefrontal cortex interacts with posterior sensory cortices to subserve working 
memory and selective attention.  However, the question of how the prefrontal 
cortex influences processes in other parts of the brain is left unanswered.  In 
other words, what is the nature of prefrontal cortex representations that enables 
the modulation of neural activity in other brain areas?  The following section of 
literature review will focus on the role of prefrontal cortex in cognitive control, 
addressing the mechanism by which prefrontal cortex exerts control over other 
neocortical brain regions.    
 
1.2.2. Prefrontal Cortex, Rule, and Cognitive Control 
 
Cognitive control is the ability to flexibly adjust thoughts and behaviors to 
meet the current task requirement, by biasing processing in favor of task-relevant 
information over other more pre-potent competitors.  Loss of cognitive control is 
marked by an overdependence on salient sensory cues or strong stimulus-
response associations to guide behaviors.  Such pattern of behavior is captured 
by humans with prefrontal damage (e.g. utilization behavior) and by monkeys 
with experimentally induced prefrontal lesions (e.g., Bianchi, 1922), suggesting 
prefrontal cortex – a neocortical region that finds its greatest elaboration in 
humans, is centrally involved in cognitive control. The previous section 
summarized a line of studies that implicate prefrontal cortex as the source of top-
down control that biases processing in other parts of the brain towards task-
relevant information.  Here, I will review several theories regarding the 
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mechanisms by which prefrontal top-down control is achieved, and how the 
prefrontal control process is regulated, so as to provide a comprehensive 
mechanist view for cognitive control. 
 
1.2.2.1. Miller and Cohen’s Integrative Theory of Cognitive 
Control 
 
What is the nature of prefrontal cortex representations that enables the 
modulation of neural activity in other brain systems for attention (sensory 
systems), recall (memory system), and response selection (motor system)?  One 
prominent theory of cognitive control proposed by Miller and Cohen (2001) states 
that prefrontal cortex exerts control over other brain areas by representing and 
maintaining of a specific type of information in working memory – the goal or the 
rule information.  Specifically, the rule representations in the prefrontal cortex are 
like “maps”, which configure the neural pathways within and between other brain 
areas that are needed to perform the task.  In other words, rule representations 
maintained in the prefrontal cortex provide a mechanism of top-down control by 
guiding the flow of neural activity along the task-relevant neural pathways, 
thereby establishing appropriate mappings between sensory inputs, internal 
states, and outputs needed to perform a given task.  Thus, from this perspective, 
biased competition serves as a general mechanism by which different types of 
representations (e.g. perception, memory, or response) are processed by the 
brain.   
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The majority of empirical support for rule information maintained via the 
prefrontal cortex stems from single-cell recording of monkey’s prefrontal cortex 
during working memory tasks.  Neurophysiological studies have shown that the 
prefrontal neurons are highly sensitive to abstract rule information: as many as 
30% to 40% of randomly selected prefrontal neurons respond to task rule after 
training (Asaad et al., 2000; Wallis et al., 2001; Bunge et al., 2003), which 
sometimes outnumber prefrontal neurons encoding sensory information (Cromer 
et al., 2010; Roy et al., 2010).  In addition, prefrontal neurons appear to be highly 
adaptive and can represent multiple, independent, categories based on task 
demands (Cromer et al., 2010).  This high adaptability and representational 
power of prefrontal cortex may underlie its ability to engage a variety of complex 
tasks with limited number of neurons.  There is also some neural evidence from 
human neuroimaging studies show populations of neurons in prefrontal cortex 
can encode abstract rule information (Haynes et al., 2007; Montojo and 
Courtney, 2008).  Taken together, these findings support Miller and Cohen 
(2001) that the prefrontal cortex subserves cognitive control by actively 
maintaining and representing rule information. 
 
1.2.2.2. Botvinick’s Conflict Monitoring Model 
 
One central question for theories of cognitive control is how the system 
determines when control is required.  In Miller and Cohen’s theory of cognitive 
control (2001) and a number of others (Norman and Shallice, 1986; Baddeley 
and Della Sala, 1996), none have offered an account of how the need for control 
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is detected. The lack of such an account renders the notion of cognitive control 
again at the hand of a homunculus.  To address this problem, Botvinick and 
colleagues proposed a conflict-monitoring model that specifies a system that 
monitors for the occurrence of conflicts in information processing.  Once this 
“conflict monitoring” system detects conflicts (presence of simultaneous 
activation of competing representations), it passes on this information to the 
control system, which exerts control by biasing information processing towards 
task-relevant information to resolve conflicts.  This model also suggests the 
anterior cingulate cortex serves as the conflict-monitor system and the lateral 
prefrontal cortex serves as the strategic-control system, providing a self-
regulating neural circuit for cognitive control.  Initial evidence supporting the 
conflict-monitoring model comes from studies showing the so-called “conflict 
adaptation effect” - the ramped up of control following a conflict event.  For 
example, Gratton et al. (1992) showed that the level of interference from a task-
irrelevant stimulus (“conflict”) is reduced following incompatible trials in the 
flanker task.  That is, participants respond faster and more accurate in an 
incompatible trial if it was preceded by another incompatible trial (iI) compared to 
a compatible trial (cI). Similar behavioral effects were also found in the Stroop 
task (Sturmer et al., 2002) and Simon task (Jones et al., 2002).  Other convincing 
evidence comes from human neuroimaging studies.  Using the Stroop color-
naming task, Kerns et al. (2004) showed greater ACC activity on the previous 
incongruent trial predicts better behavioral adjustment (faster RT) and greater 
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prefrontal cortex activity on the current incongruent trial, supporting a role of 
anterior cingulate cortex engaged in conflict monitoring. 
Later developments of this theory have focused on whether the self-
regulating conflict-control circuit proposed in the original model operates in a  
“domain-general” or “domain-specific” manner.  Several studies have utilized the 
“conflict adaptation effect” described above to test whether the control process 
recruited by one type of conflict (e.g. Stroop conflict) can facilitate the resolution 
of another type of conflict (e.g. Simon conflict) (Kunde, 2003; Wendt et al., 2006; 
Egner, 2007). If the up-regulation triggered by one type of conflict were to 
facilitate the resolution of another type of conflict, then it would support a domain-
general model of conflict adaptation.  Otherwise, it would support a domain-
specific model of conflict adaptation.   Overall, results from these studies are 
more in line with the “domain-specific” hypothesis of conflict resolution, as conflict 
types are found to be non-interactive (for a review, see Egner, 2008).  This 
“domain-specific” hypothesis has interesting implications in the way we think 
about “control”.  If conflict resolution were indeed conflict-specific, there might be 
dissociable and specialized conflict-control circuits that can operate in parallel to 
detect and resolve conflicts arising from different types of representations (e.g. 
stimulus-stimulus conflict, stimulus-response conflict).  In relation to our 
hypothesis, it is even possible that a different neural circuit will be recruited for 
conflict resolution of rule representations that is independent from those recruited 
for response conflicts. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that a self-regulating conflict-driven control 
system is more closely in line with what’s known as “reactive control”.  That is, 
the control is triggered automatically by an internal signal of uncertainty.  This 
control process operates differently from the goal-directed “proactive control”, 
such as actively maintaining the goals or task rule information in mind to enable 
optimal cognitive performance, similar to what was proposed in Miller and Cohen 
(2001) integrative cognitive control model.  In the following section, I will review 
Braver et al. (2007) dual mechanisms of control framework to further examine the 
two distinct control processes. 
 
1.2.2.3. Braver’s Proactive and Reactive Control Modes 
 
From this framework, there are two qualitatively distinct control modes for 
resolving conflicts: “proactive control” and “reactive control”.  In the proactive 
control mode, the goal-relevant representations are actively maintained in a 
preparatory manner until the successful completion of the task.  On the other 
hand, in the reactive control mode, the goal-relevant representations are only 
retrieved or re-activated after a high interference event is detected.  This model 
supports a view that different cognitive control mechanisms need not engage 
through anatomically distinct brain regions, but rather be implemented at different 
points in time.  Specifically, proactive control is associated with sustained activity 
occurring at the time when contextual cues are presented (cued-based), whereas 
the reactive control is associated with transient activity triggering by the 
incongruent probe (probe-based). 
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Burgess and Braver (2010) demonstrated the temporal dynamics of 
prefrontal cortex activation changes as a function of task demands using a 
recent-probes item-recognition task.  In this study, they manipulated task 
demands by varying the frequency of recent negative probes (a non-target probe 
appeared as target in the previous trial) in a block.  During the high interference 
expectancy blocks (frequent recent negatives), the activity in left lateral prefrontal 
cortex increased during the delay period and lasted for the entire block, 
consistent with recruitment of proactive control.  On the contrary, in the low 
interference expectancy blocks (rare recent negatives), the activity in left inferior 
prefrontal cortex (a slightly different prefrontal area) exhibited a transient 
increase of activity at the time of the probe, specifically during the recent 
negative probe trials, consistent with the recruitment of a reactive control. 
There are several interesting points we can take away from this dual 
control model.  First, control processes can operate through multiple routes 
towards successful task performance.  For one, control may be drawn upon to 
emphasize the task-relevant features such that it preempts the irrelevant 
distractors from entering working memory, as in the case of proactive control.  
Alternatively, when both relevant target and irrelevant distractors enter working 
memory and compete for cortical representation, control may excite only the 
stimulus-response mapping for the relevant stimulus and/or suppress the 
stimulus-response mapping for the irrelevant stimulus, as in the case of reactive 
control.  In addition, task demands may be the determining factor when weighing 
between proactive and reactive control strategies.  Therefore, it is possible that 
	   16	  
small changes in an otherwise similar task might lead participants to resort to a 




The biased competition model of visual attention suggests that the neural 
activity in visual cortex is modulated by the effect of attention on an underlying 
suppressive interaction among competing stimuli, where neural activity is 
enhanced in neurons coding the behaviorally relevant visual stimuli at the 
expense of the neurons coding the irrelevant stimuli.  Several lines of evidence 
suggest that the prefrontal cortex provides the top-down influence to bias 
information processing in the posterior cortices.  It is thought the prefrontal cortex 
exerts control over other brain areas by sustained active maintenance of goals or 
task rules in working memory, to bias attention, memory, and action systems in a 
goal-driven manner.  To answer the question concerning how control systems 
“know” when to exert top-down control to bias processing, a conflict-monitoring 
component is proposed in which ACC detects occurrence of conflicts in 
information processing, thereby triggering compensatory adjustments in 
prefrontal control.  Finally, cognitive control can operate at different point in time, 
or speaking in a broader context, control processes can operate through multiple 
routes: it can either operate proactively, as in the anticipatory maintenance of 
goal-relevant information before its implementation.  Alternatively, it can proceed 
reactively, in which both irrelevant and relevant representations associated with 
the target were retrieved, and control proceeds to select the appropriate one.   
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While these models provide valuable insights in terms of how cognitive 
control might be implemented by the prefrontal cortex, what remains unclear is 
the precise nature of the type of information prefrontal cortex represents, which 
allows it to modulate activity in other parts of the brain.  According to the 
cognitive control theory by Miller and Cohen (2001), the prefrontal cortex exerts 
control over other parts of the brain by maintaining abstract rules or goal 
information in working memory.  Thus, in what follows, I will review a line of 
literature regarding how abstract rules are represented, maintained, and 
implemented by the brain, so as to get a better understanding of what role do 
task rule representations play in cognitive control.  
 
1.3. Selection from Abstract Rule Representations 
 
Much of our daily behavior is guided by task rules.  While some rules are 
based on well-learned stimulus-response associations (e.g. see a red light, put 
on the brake), others are more abstract in a sense they are not tied to specific 
sensory stimulus responses and can be applied to situations alike.  For example, 
we can apply what we learned about dining etiquettes from restaurants visited in 
the past to a brand new restaurant.  This ability to represent “abstract rule” is 
thought to critically depend on prefrontal cortex, because damage to this area 
often leads to deficits in the patient’s ability to perform tasks requiring higher 
orders of abstraction, while sparing the ability to perform lower-level, simple 
contingency tasks (Badre et al., 2009). 
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When studying how do neurons in prefrontal cortex represent abstract 
rules, many neurophysiological and human neuroimaging studies in the past 
have used rules that are tied to specific stimulus features (e.g. location-matching 
rule vs. shape-matching rule as in the study by Hoshi et al., 2000) or behavioral 
responses (e.g. fixed stimulus-response associations as in Murray et al., 2000; 
Passingham et al., 2000).  Such studies can be problematic when it comes to the 
interpretation of rule-specific activity in prefrontal cortex, because the difference 
in the distribution of neural activity revealed by comparing one rule versus 
another may simply reflect attention to the sensory properties of the cue that the 
subjects were required to maintain in working memory (e.g. the specific location 
or shape information of the cue) or reflect the preparation of specific motor 
response that was automatically triggered by the cue stimulus, rather than the 
task rules themselves (e.g. location-matching rule: if the location of the cue 
matches to the target item, then press left key).   
More recently, several investigators, including those in our lab, have 
attempted to address this problem by studying abstract rules or relational 
information that are independent from specific sensory features or behavioral 
responses (Montojo and Courtney, 2008; Ackerman and Courtney, 2012; Ikkai et 
al., 2014).  So far, these studies support the view that different brain networks 
represent non-sensory abstract information and sensory-specific item 
information. 
Thus, in the following section, I will review the neural representation of 
abstract rules, addressing the critical role of prefrontal cortex in representing and 
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maintaining rule-specific information that serves to bias information processing in 
other brain areas.  Particularly, the “abstract” rules are defined as general rules 
or principles that are not tied to specific events (sensory features or behavioral 
responses), and can be extended to situations alike.  Then, I will discuss the 
cognitive control processes associated with abstract rule use.  For example, the 
control process associated with shifting between task rules (e.g. task-switching) 
and resolving conflicting task rules (e.g. Stroop).  This would allow us to get a 
better understanding of the neural mechanism involve in the control of abstract 
representations, such as task rules.  
 
1.3.1. Representation of Rules 
 
Goal-directed behavior requires the ability of the brain to extract 
regularities across experiences of our interactions with the environment.  By 
forming associations between contexts, actions and their outcomes, we can 
develop an internal representation of the “rule of the game” that allows us to 
make predictions of what actions are likely to achieve our current goal in a given 
context, and what to anticipate in similar situations.  Therefore, the 
representation of a task rule might be encoded by neurons whose activity reflects 
the learned relationships between events.  Neurons in prefrontal cortex do reflect 
such property: many of them develop selectivity for learned associations between 
sensory cues, voluntary actions and rewards (Watanabe, 1992; Asaad et al., 
1998; Fuster et al., 2000).  However, if each experience were to store as 
association between events, then it would require a prodigious amount of 
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storage.  Luckily, our brains have evolved the ability to abstract rules or principles 
from specifics experiences.  The ability to represent abstract rules allows us to 
deal with different situations without needing to memorize every specific 
relationship between events.  It also allows us to deal with novel situations.  So 
how are abstract rules encoded in the brain?  What is the neural correlate for 
representing abstract rule information? 
Support for a role for prefrontal neurons in representing abstract rules 
comes from neurophysiological studies of monkeys alternated between different 
task rules (Hoshi et al., 1998; White and Wise, 1999; Asaad et al., 2000).  For 
example, Hoshi et al. (1998) trained monkeys to reach a target that either 
matched the shape (shape-matching rule) or the location (location-matching rule) 
of the cue, the correct response depended on which rule was currently in effect.  
They found that some neurons in the prefrontal cortex were selective for the 
target features (circle vs. triangle), regardless of the task.  On the other hand, 
they also found some neurons were selective for the type of task (shape-
matching vs. location-matching task), despite it is the same target item.  In other 
words, for the same target item, these neurons responded differently depending 
on the task rule.  Such rule-selective prefrontal neurons have also been found in 
other studies utilizing different types of rules, such as “object” vs. “spatial” vs. 
“associative” rules (White and Wise, 1999; Asaad et al., 2000). 
In all of these tasks described above, these rules are directly tied with 
particular sensory features of the cue; therefore, the difference in the distribution 
of neural activity revealed by comparing one rule versus another may simply 
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reflect attention to the sensory properties of the cue that the subjects were 
required to maintain in working memory (e.g. the specific location or shape 
information of the cue), rather than the task rules per se (e.g. location-matching 
rule: if the location of the cue matches to the target item, then press left key).  
The rule-specific activity should be independent from any specific stimulus 
features.  This problem was addressed in a neurophysiological study (Wallis et 
al., 2001) using operation-specific rules, rather than domain-specific rules that 
are based on the sensory domain/feature of the cue.  In this study, monkeys 
were trained to respond whether two successively presented pictures were 
identical or different.  The “match” rule requires the release of a bar when two 
pictures match.  On the contrary, the “non-match” rule requires the release of a 
bar when the two pictures don’t match.  In addition, to disambiguate neural 
activity related to the sensory properties of the cue from the rule that the cues 
signified, the researchers used two distinct cues from different sensory modalities 
to signify the same rule.  They found a group of neurons in prefrontal cortex were 
selectively active for one rule over the other.  Moreover, monkeys were able to 
make correct responses for stimuli that they just saw for the first time, which 
further supports the hypothesis that neurons in prefrontal cortex have the 
capacity to represent abstract rules.    
Bunge et al. (2003) used a task similar to that of Wallis et al. (2001) to 
study abstract rule maintenance and retrieval in humans.  By including a delay 
period during which participants were required to either maintain the “match” or 
“non-match” rule or a simple stimulus-response relationship, the researchers 
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found frontal, parietal and temporal cortices were sensitive to rule type during 
cue presentation, suggesting that they were involved in rule retrieval.  On the 
other hand, only the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex continued 
to show sensitivity to rule type during delay period, suggesting that they were 
relatively more involved in maintenance of the relevant response contingency.  
However, another interpretation for the match vs. non-match tasks is that 
subjects learned the match rule as the default strategy; and to perform the non-
match task, they simply perform the default match task and then reverse the 
button press response contingency.  In that case, the observed brain activity may 
reflect preparation of motor response, rather than abstract rule representations 
(match rule vs. non-match rule).   
In another study, Haynes et al. (2007) used multivoxel-pattern 
classification analysis (MVPA) to test whether the increased activity normally 
observed throughout prefrontal cortex during the delay period in working memory 
tasks actually contains rule-specific information (i.e. signals related to rule 
preparation).  Participants in this study freely chose between two arithmetic 
operations (subtraction vs. addition) and performed a calculation based on two 
random numbers.  The researchers found the spatial pattern of BOLD signals in 
the anterior region of medial prefrontal cortex successfully predicted which of the 
two tasks the participants were intending to perform.  Since the arithmetic 
operations are not tied to any specific sensory stimuli or responses, this study 
provides strong evidence that abstract rules can be represented by distributed 
patterns of activity in the prefrontal cortex.   
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So far, the above studies suggest that neurons in the prefrontal cortex can 
represent and maintain abstract rule information that is independent from any 
physical attributes.  But how do these abstract rule representations interact with 
or influence on one another in order to guide behavior?  For example, when a 
stimulus invokes a set of rules, how should we choose?  Or consider a situation 
where one needs to flexibly switch between different rules to meet the changing 
environmental demands.  How is the shifting between task rules achieved?  In 
the previous section, I review a line of work regarding the cognitive control 
mechanisms for concrete (sensory) information.  When two sensory stimuli within 
a cell’s receptive field compete for cortical representation, the competition is 
resolved by enhancing activity in the brain area representing the task-relevant 
stimulus at the expense of the brain area representing task-irrelevant stimulus.  
Can similar mechanism also apply to abstract rule representations?  In what 
follows, I will discuss the cognitive control processes associated with abstract 
rules using task-switching paradigm.  In this paradigm, participants are required 
to switch between two competing tasks (or, strictly speaking, to switch between 
appropriate rules of a task).  An understanding of the cognitive control 
mechanisms for task switching would allow us to answer questions such as how 
selection between abstract rule representations is achieved. 
 
1.3.2. Task Switching 
 
Task switching paradigm is frequently used to study how are appropriate 
task sets selected and implemented according to new task requirements.  A “task 
	   24	  
set” typically refers to the rule of a particular task, whose representation is 
independent from other sensory aspects of a task, such as task cues and task 
targets (Sakai, 2008).  
It is typically observed that task performance is slower and less accurate 
when switching between two tasks compared to repeating the same task in 
sequence (Jersild, 1927; Logan and Bundesen, 2003; Monsell, 2003).  The 
additional time needed for task switching compared to task repetition is referred 
to as “switch cost”, which is thought to involve cognitive control processes 
necessary for updating task goals and/or setting up for the new task set (for a 
review, see Sakai, 2008).   
There are two main theories that provide different explanations with 
regards to the source of switch costs: (1) the task-set reconfiguration hypothesis 
(TSR; Rogers R.D., 1995; Brown and Besner, 2001); and (2) the task-set inertia 
hypothesis (TSI; Allport et al., 1994). 
The TSR hypothesis suggested that switch costs reflect the time needed 
to reconfigure the cognitive system for the upcoming task set.    In order to 
perform a task, participants enter a task-dependent cognitive state, and this state 
will remain constant throughout the duration of the task until another task state is 
required, at which time control processes shifts the system into a new task state 
(Logan and Gordon, 2001).  From this perspective, TSR may involve inhibition of 
the previous task set as well as activation of the new task-set.  This theory also 
predicts that if sufficient time is allowed to prepare for the upcoming task, the 
switch costs should be eliminated.  In support of the TSR account, it was found 
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that lengthening the interval between task cue and stimulus onset (i.e. 
preparation time) significantly reduced the observed switch costs (Meiran, 1996; 
Meiran et al., 2000).  However, this preparation benefit reached a substantial 
asymptote after ~600 ms of preparation (Monsell, 2003).  One possible 
explanation is that task set reconfiguration processes cannot be done until the 
stimulus attributes exogenously triggers the associated new task set (Rogers 
R.D., 1995).  This exogenous task switching process is thought to be 
independent from the endogenous control process that emphasizes the 
deliberate intentions that are governed by goals. 
On the other hand, the task-set inertia hypothesis proposed that switch 
costs are the result of proactive interference from the previously performed task.  
This hypothesis was supported by a variant of the Stroop task in which 
participants switched between the less practiced color-naming task (a “weaker” 
task set) and the more practiced word-reading task (a “stronger” task set).  
Asymmetric switch costs were observed in the study – the switch costs were 
significantly greater when switching to the more familiar word-reading task set 
compared to switching to the less-practiced color-naming task set (Allport et al., 
1994).  The asymmetry of switch costs cannot be explained by the task set 
reconfiguration hypothesis, because reconfiguration to a more familiar, and 
hence stronger task set, should take less time for the brain system to reconfigure 
to the new task state.  Rather, the TSI account (Allport et al., 1994) states that 
successful performance of the weaker task (color-naming) requires greater 
cognitive control resources to bias the relevant color-naming task pathway and to 
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inhibit the competing task representations from the stronger word-reading 
pathway.  Consequently, this inhibition carries over to the next trial, which results 
in greater difficulty to retrieve these previously inhibited word-naming task 
representations.  In addition, the compensatory enhancement of the weaker 
color-naming task also carries over to the subsequent trial and further interferes 
with access to the word-reading task set.  Hence, according to task-set inertia 
account, switch costs reflect the extra time and effort to resolve competition from 
the previously activated task set.  
Yeung et al. (2006) has provided support for the task set inertia 
hypothesis by using functional neuroimaging to investigate between-task 
competition in a task-switching paradigm.  Specifically, participants in this study 
were presented with overlapping face and word stimuli and switched between a 
face task (judging the gender of the face) and a word task (judging whether the 
word has two syllables or not).  Because word stimuli and face stimuli activate 
distinguishable cortical areas, this approach allows the researchers to measure 
the task-dependent neural activity when participants switched from one task to 
another.  The researchers found that activity increased during a task switch in 
brain areas selective for the previous, now-irrelevant task, and that the 
behavioral switching cost positively correlated with the switch-related neural 
activity in the task-irrelevant areas (areas selective for the previously relevant but 
now irrelevant task), but not the task-relevant areas (areas selective for the 
currently relevant task).  These results support the task-set inertia hypothesis 
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that interference from a recently performed task is a determining factor for switch 
costs.   
Despite the proactive interference from the previously performed task is a 
well accepted theory for explaining switch costs, it is now more of a consensus 
among researchers that a part of the switch costs also reflects the time-
consuming, endogenous, task set reconfiguration process (Monsell, 2003). 
However, the foregoing accounts of how appropriate task sets are selected and 
implemented according to current task requirements is not without problem.  
First, many of the task-switching paradigms that were used to study task 
selection required participants to select different levels of representations, 
ranging from selection of perceptual inputs (e.g. attending to the external cue or 
select relevant stimulus features), task rule representations (e.g. retrieving task 
rules from memory), to motor response (e.g. selecting appropriate response for a 
given stimulus).  Thus, during a task switch, a combination of these processes 
needs to be internally reconfigured for successful performance.  This is 
problematic because the task rule selection process is conceptually different from 
those involve response selection and perceptual selection. It remains unclear 
how selection of purely abstract rule representations is achieved and whether 
there is a common mechanism underlying the selection of different types of 
information (e.g. memories, perceptual stimuli, rules, responses).  As previously 
discussed, both single-cell recording and human fMRI studies have shown 
prefrontal neurons can represent abstract rules.  However, it remains unclear 
whether prefrontal cortex can also be the source of the bias signal for selection of 
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task rules that it represents.  In other words, can the process of bias competition 
also take place within the prefrontal cortex?  To answer this, the first logical step 
would be to design a new paradigm that can separate rule-based selection 
process from stimulus-based or response-based selection processes.  This is 
addressed in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) where we introduced an experimental 
manipulation that varied the degree of conflict in selecting task rules 
independently from the sensory features of the cue and cue-trigger behavior 
responses.  We then investigated whether the source of top-down modulation 
that resolves competition between abstract rule representations is derived from 
structures within prefrontal cortex, and whether the principle of biased 
competition also applies to the selection of competing abstract information, such 
as selecting relevant over irrelevant task rules. 
Second, there may be two different control processes involved in task 
switching: 1.) The endogenous (i.e. goal-driven) process that involves the 
activation of the new task rule according to the current goals or context, 
independent of specific stimuli and responses; and 2.) The exogenous (i.e. 
stimulus-driven) process that involves the activation of a task set invoked by the 
stimulus attributes. As mentioned earlier, lengthening the preparation time 
between cue and stimulus onset does not totally eliminate switch cost.  The 
residual switch cost has been linked to exogenous processes that only come on-
line at the time of target presentation (Rogers R.D., 1995).  Thus, in order to 
more directly study the endogenous (goal-driven) process of how appropriate 
task sets are selected, one needs to design a new paradigm that emphasize the 
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voluntary selection process of the relevant task rule.  That is, rather than having 
a task cue that is always associated with or automatically invokes the same task 
set, the participants need to know the current context in order to correctly retrieve 
the meaning of the task cue.  This context-dependent task selection process is 
partially tested in a study by Brass and von Cramon (2004).  The authors devised 
a new task-switching paradigm in which participants were required to alternate 
between a parity task, a number task, or no task at all; the instruction was based 
on a task cue preceding target items (number from 1 to 9, except 5).  Importantly, 
the task cues had two different dimensions: color and form.  The relevant 
dimension was indicated at the beginning of each block and alternated across 
blocks throughout the experiment.  The relevant and irrelevant dimensions could 
either indicate the same task (congruent cue) or different tasks (incongruent 
cue), or no task at all (neutral cue).  Because the bivalent cues (congruent and 
incongruent) did not always provide unequivocal task information, the selection of 
relevant task rule required maintenance of goals or relevant contexts (color or 
form) in working memory to bias task selection.  Thus, successful performance 
relied heavily on the endogenous control of task selection.  The authors were 
able to show greater activation in lateral prefrontal cortex and intraparietal sulcus 
when contrasting the bivalent conditions (congruent and incongruent) to the 
univalent condition (neural).  Because this selection process was specifically 
based on the processing of the cue, the observed activations suggested that 
these two areas were involved in the endogenous selection of relevant task 
context that in turn determines the appropriate task rule.  However, to the 
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authors’ surprise, the contrast between congruent condition and incongruent 
condition did not yield significant difference, neurally or behaviorally.  The main 
reason for such null result is thought to relate to the weak association between 
cue dimensions and task rules.  In their task, both relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions of the cue were only weakly associated with task rules.  Therefore, it 
is very likely that the irrelevant dimension of the cue were not able to 
automatically elicit the retrieval of the associated task rule.  To overcome this, it 
is assumed that a pre-test training procedure on the associations between cue 
dimensions and task rules is required.  The training procedure would be 
incorporated into our own experimental design in order to successfully produce 
conflicts at the task rule level.      
 
1.4. Conclusions and Open Questions 
  
 While much is known about the cognitive control mechanism associated 
with sensory information, relatively little is known about the cognitive control 
mechanism for abstract information such as task rules.  For example, how 
conflict among abstract rule representations is resolved?  How switching or 
shifting between abstract rule representations is achieved by the brain?  Is the 
cognitive control mechanism for rule information conflict-specific or domain-
general?  Therefore, the main goal of this dissertation is to investigate various 
control processes associated with abstract rule representations. 
 In order to study the “pure” abstract rule representations independent from 
any stimulus features or behavioral responses, the current study utilized a new 
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paradigm in which we manipulated the degree of conflict directly at the task rule 
level.  We defined abstract rule as the if-then function that establishes 
relationships among a set of stimuli and potential responses, where such 
relationships are independent of particular stimulus properties or motor 
responses that are associated with the stimulus.    
 Experiment 1 seeks to elucidate the cognitive control mechanisms 
responsible for resolving conflicts among abstract rules.   Specifically, in order to 
select the appropriate task rule to correctly produce the desired behavior, the 
participants need to know the current context and use it to guide the selection of 
task rule.  Thus, this allows us to more directly study the endogenous (goal-
driven) process of task rule selection.  The main hypothesis to be tested in this 
experiment was whether abstract rule representations can be maintained as a 
type of information in working memory via prefrontal cortex, and the process of 
biased competition occurs between the prefrontal cortex and sensory or motor 
regions also occurs within the prefrontal cortex itself, by biasing neural 
processing towards the prefrontal neurons coding the relevant abstract task rule 
over the irrelevant one.  Alternatively, the selection mechanism responsible for 
resolving conflicts among abstract rules may be qualitatively different from those 
resolving conflicts among stimulus properties or motor responses.  If that is the 
case, then other selection mechanisms will need to be proposed for resolving 
conflicting rules.  
 Experiment 2 in this dissertation is a direct follow-up to experiment 1 and 
uses the same paradigm and data set to ask the question that whether the 
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cognitive control mechanism for goal-driven rule selection different from that of 
stimulus-driven rule switching.  As previously discussed in the task-switching 
section, part of the switching cost for shifting between rules reflects the stimulus-
driven process which involves the activation of a task set invoked by the cue 
stimuli.  In any given task-switching paradigm, each of the cue stimuli is always 
associated with the same task rule throughout the course of the experiment (e.g. 
triangle cue always means task A and circle cue always means task B).  
Therefore, after doing multiple trials, task performance becomes more stimulus-
driven, as the meaning of the cue stays constant.  In comparison to our current 
experimental design, participants are required to remember the context in which 
the cue was presented to correctly retrieve the meaning of the cue, and at the 
same time, to switch rules across trials.  Therefore, the current experimental 
design allows us to examine the control processes associated with two different 
sources of task conflict: rule selection and rule switching.  This allows us to 
answer the bigger question that whether the cognitive control mechanism 
recruited to resolve conflict between abstract rules is conflict-specific (dissociable 
cognitive control systems) or domain-general (single cognitive control system). 
 Cognitive control can be modulated by task demands.  According to the 
conflict monitoring literature, congruency effects can be modulated by the 
proportions of incongruent trials versus congruent trials within a single block.  In 
Experiment 3, we further investigate the specificity of cognitive control for 
resolving different types of task conflict (i.e. switch between different task rules 
versus selecting appropriate task rule over the inappropriate one) by introducing 
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a proportion conflict manipulation.  Specifically, the goal was to see whether (1) 
the proportion manipulation would have similar effect of conflict resolution on 
both conflict types; and (2) whether the effect of proportion manipulation for one 
conflict type would transfer to the other conflict type within the same block.  This 
would help to answer the question concerning the specificity of cognitive control 
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2. Chapter 2: Conflict Resolution of Abstract Rules 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 Goal-directed behavior is thought to depend on the ability of the brain to 
represent and implement the task rules that would produce appropriate behavior 
for a given situation. Studies have shown that neurons in the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) can encode abstract task rules that are not bounded by a specific set of 
stimuli or overlearned stimulus-response associations. Rather, these rule 
representations support generalization of task performance to familiar and novel 
situations alike (Asaad et al., 2000; Hoshi et al., 2000; Wallis et al., 2001; Bunge 
et al., 2003).  It has been proposed that this abstract representation of task rule 
within the PFC biases processing throughout the rest of the brain by selectively 
enhancing activity of brain areas that encode the task-relevant information (Miller 
and Cohen, 2001).  This is supported by neuroimaging studies in humans 
demonstrating rule-dependent interaction between PFC and posterior sensori-
motor regions responsible for task execution (e.g., Stroop, 1935; Sakai and 
Passingham, 2003; Egner and Hirsch, 2005; Sakai and Passingham, 2006; Chiu 
et al., 2011; Miller et al., 2011; Nelissen et al., 2013; Waskom et al., 2014), and 
transcranial magnetic stimulation studies in humans showing disruption of PFC 
causally modulates the neural activity in posterior sensory cortex (Higo et al., 
2011; Zanto et al., 2011; Lee and D'Esposito, 2012). 
 This mechanism in which feedback from the PFC exerts influence over 
posterior regions to bias competition in favor of task-relevant sensory and motor 
representations is well established (for reviews, see Miller, 2000; Ridderinkhof et 
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al., 2004).  It is not clear, however, whether the same mechanism can be applied 
to situations in which the competition is among abstract representations of task 
rules.  In such a case, both the source of the bias signal and the target of that 
signal could be within PFC. When multiple task rules are simultaneously 
activated, analogous to when multiple sensory stimulus or motor response 
representations are activated, how is this competition resolved? It is an important 
issue because the mechanism responsible for resolving conflicts between 
representations of non-sensory information might be different from those 
resolving conflicts between sensory representations of stimuli (for a review, see 
Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000) or between potential actions (for a review, see 
Cisek and Kalaska, 2010).   
 In the current study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) to investigate the mechanism by which we can select relevant over 
irrelevant task rules. If the mechanism were similar to that which is thought to 
govern selection of sensory and motor representations (Desimone, 1998; Miller 
and Cohen, 2001), then we would expect to find two specific results. First, 
conflict between abstract rules would be expected to result in behavioral 
impairment and be accompanied by increased activity in a cognitive control 
network that helps to overcome the behavioral impairment. Second, conflict 
among abstract representations would be expected to be resolved by feedback 
from the prefrontal regions representing the currently relevant rule to the non-
sensory and non-motor brain areas processing the abstract information needed 
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to perform the task according to that rule, enhancing relevant information, and 
perhaps secondarily inhibiting irrelevant information. 
 Participants were extensively trained so that strong associations were 
formed between different cue dimensions and one of two abstract task rules. 
Conflict was manipulated by having different cue dimensions (color and shape) 
associated either with the same task rule (congruent) or different ones 
(incongruent).  Participants switched between two tasks according to the rule 
given by the currently relevant cue dimension, which was instructed at the 
beginning of each block and alternated across blocks.  Phonological and 
semantic tasks were used, as they were previously shown to preferentially 
activate distinct brain areas (Sakai and Passingham, 2006; Lau and Passingham, 
2007), allowing us to measure the degree of conflict between relevant and 
irrelevant rules, and the effect of top-down modulation that resolves this conflict. 
By using these abstract rules combined with trial-unique words to which the rules 
were applied, participants could not learn a specific stimulus-response 
association, but rather needed to resolve the conflict at a more abstract level of 
representation. 
 
2.2. Materials and Methods 
Participants.  Sixteen (12 females, 4 males) right-handed, healthy young 
adults between 18 and 35 (mean age 20±2.5 years) participated the study.  All 
participants were native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, no history of head injury, substance abuse, neurological or psychiatric 
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disorders, and were not taking any medications at the time of the study.  The 
protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Boards of the Johns Hopkins 
University and the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions.  All participants provided 
written informed consent. 
Experimental procedure.  Participants were asked to make either a 
phonological or a semantic judgment for a visually presented word, as quickly as 
possible, while maintaining accuracy. We chose these semantic and 
phonological tasks because previous studies have shown that they preferentially 
activate distinctive regions within the frontal cortex (McDermott et al., 2003; 
Sakai and Passingham, 2006).  This enabled us to use the blood oxygenation 
level dependent (BOLD) activity in these task-selective areas as a proxy for 
measuring the degree to which the relevant versus the irrelevant rule 
representations were activated by the task cues.  The phonological rule required 
the participants to indicate, by pressing one of two buttons, whether the 
presented word contained two syllables or not. The semantic rule required the 
participants to indicate whether the meaning of the word referred to a concrete 
object or not.  Left/Right button response mappings were counterbalanced 
across participants. To equate difficulty between the two task rules, the word 
stimuli were selected using criteria similar to that of Sakai and Passingham 
(2006).  All the word stimuli were nouns with written frequency over 15, taken 
from the Medical Research Council Psycholinguistic Database 
(http://websites.psychology.uwa.edu.au/school/MRCDatabase/uwa_mrc.htm).  
Half of the words had two syllables and the other half had one or three syllables; 
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half had abstract meaning with a concreteness rating below 300 and the other 
half had concrete meaning with a concreteness rating above 500, according to 
the database. Different word stimuli were used in the pre-task training, scanning 
session, and localizer scans.  Furthermore, the word stimuli in the scanning 
session (320 words) and localizer scans (144 words) appeared only once without 
repetition.  This approach ensured that participants could not learn a specific 
stimulus-response association, but rather had to maintain the relevant rule at a 
more abstract level. 
Training sessions.  An example trial is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The 
applicable rule to apply was indicated by a task cue presented at the beginning of 
each trial.  Importantly, participants trained on the two dimensions of the task cue 
(color and shape) on a computer prior to the scanning session. There were two 
separate training sessions, one for each cue dimension.  In the color training 
session, participants responded according to the color dimension of the cue (e.g., 
green indicates the semantic task and blue indicates the phonological task), and 
in the shape training session, participants responded according to the shape 
dimension of the cue (e.g., circle indicates the semantic task and triangle 
indicates the phonological task).  The task cue meaning and the rule assignment 
for both training sessions, as well as the order of the training sessions were 
counterbalanced across participants.  Task instruction and a brief practice 
consisting of 24 trials were given at the beginning of each training session to 
make sure the participants understood the stimuli and procedures.  Participants 
were instructed to respond according to the relevant cue dimension (i.e., either 
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shape or color), which remained constant over the entire course of the training 
sessions.   To ensure both feature dimensions of the cue were strongly 
associated with their corresponding tasks, participants performed 320 trials over 
the course of 30 minutes on each dimension (an hour in total for both the color 
and shape training sessions) in a quiet laboratory room.  A self-paced break was 
provided after every 64 trials. For each trial, the sequence began with a 300-ms 
task cue indicating the upcoming task, followed by a 300 ms delay.  A target 
word then appeared and remained on screen until a response was made or the 
2000 ms time limit was reached.  After each response, feedback was presented 
for 300 ms to indicate whether the response was “Correct”, “Incorrect” or “Too 
slow”.  The next trial began after a fixed interval of 3000 ms. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) session.  After the training 
sessions, participants performed a brief practice of 64 trials outside of the 
scanner approximately 20 minutes before the scan began. Inside the scanner, 
participants performed 5 runs of 64 trials of the same semantic and phonological 
judgments.  For each run, both in the practice and during scanning, trials were 
blocked into four “Color Blocks” (color was the relevant dimension), which 
alternated with four “Shape Blocks” (shape was the relevant dimension).  Blocks 
were separated by a 11s rest period during which a fixation cross was presented. 
A 2-second instruction screen was presented at the beginning of each block 
(“Attend Color” or “Attend Shape”) to inform the participants of the relevant cue 
dimension for that block.  After the instruction screen, eight trials were presented 
using the identical trial sequence as previously described for the training phase, 
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with the exception that the target word remained on the screen for the entire 
2000 ms. Participants were told to focus on that cue dimension until the next 
instruction screen was presented.  There were equal numbers of trials for the 
eight experimental conditions based on the relevant cue dimensions (color or 
shape), congruency of the cue (congruent or incongruent) and tasks 
(phonological or semantic), and the conditions were fully-crossed with left versus 
right response buttons, number of switch versus repeat trials, and whether the 
correct response for the target word for one task was the same or different as the 
correct response for that word according to the other task. The participants held 
one response button box in each hand, which sent the responses to a Cedrus 
RB-610 Response Box (Cedrus, San Pedro, CA) via fiber optic cables.  Reaction 
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Figure 2.1. Example of trial events progression (A) and schematic drawing of 
task cues and their associated task rules (B).  Each task cue had two 
dimensions: color and shape. For a given cue, each dimension could either be 
associated with the same task rule (congruent cues) or with different task rules 
(incongruent cues). During the training phase, the participants only needed to 
respond according to one of the two cue dimensions for the entire training 
session (320 trials), and then to repeat the same procedure based on the other 
cue dimension (320 trials).  During the scanning session, the relevant cue 
dimension was instructed at the beginning of each block (“Attend Color” or 
“Attend Shape”). The relevant dimension remained constant within a block (8 
trials per block), but alternated across blocks. 
Functional localizer.  The scanning session ended with functional localizer 
runs to independently identify brain regions preferentially activated during the use 
of phonological and semantic rules for every participant.  During the localizer 
runs, participants performed phonological and semantic tasks in alternating 
blocks. Each localizer task sequence began with the presentation of a 2000ms 
instruction screen (“Syllable”, “Concrete”) indicating the upcoming task, which 
was followed by a 1000 ms preparation period and then by six trials of the 
corresponding task.   Verbal instruction cues (“Syllable” for phonological task and 
“Concrete” for semantic task), rather than the colored shape cues, were used to 
avoid cue congruency effects.  Within each block, word stimuli were presented 
for 1700 ms with a 300-ms inter-trial interval. Participants were instructed to 
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respond while the word stimulus was on the screen.  A brief 1000-ms feedback 
indicating the overall performance for that block was given at the end of each 
block. Participants completed two runs of localizer task, each lasting 4.9 minutes.  
Each run consisted of 12 blocks (6 blocks of the semantic task alternated with 6 
blocks of the phonological task), interleaved with 8 s of rest when participants 
passively viewed a fixation cross.   
fMRI data acquisition and pre-processing.  fMRI scanning was conducted 
at the F. M. Kirby Research Center for Functional Brain Imaging in Kennedy 
Krieger Institute (Baltimore, MD) on a 3.0T Philips Intera scanner equipped with 
32-channel SENSE head coil.   High-resolution T1-weighted anatomical images 
were collected using a MP-RAGE sequence (150 axial slices, TR = 7.9 ms, TE = 
3.7 ms, flip angle = 8°, matrix = 212 x 172, voxel size of 1 x 1 x 1 mm).  Whole 
brain T2*-weighted functional images were collected in an ascending sequential 
fashion, using an echo-planar imaging sequence (35 axial slices, TR = 2000 ms, 
TE = 3.7 ms, flip angle = 70°, in-plane resolution of 2.5 mm in 80 x 80 matrix, 
slice thickness = 2.5 mm, with a 0.5mm gap).   
All preprocessing and statistical analyses were done using SPM8 
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging). The first 6 volumes of each run were 
discarded to allow for scanner equilibration.  The remaining functional image 
volumes were corrected for differences in slice acquisition timing using sinc 
interpolation, realigned to the first image volume to correct for head motion. The 
anatomical image was first co-registered to the mean of the motion-corrected 
functional images, and then it was segmented and spatially normalized to the 
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tissue probability maps included in the SPM8 toolbox using both linear and non-
linear transformations.  The normalization parameters  (i.e. deformation field) 
derived from the anatomical image were then applied to all the functional images.  
In this step, the functional images were re-sampled to the same dimension (1.5 
mm cubic voxels) as the anatomical images.  Finally, the functional images were 
smoothed with an 8 mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.  
Temporal autocorrelation was corrected using a first-order autoregressive model, 
and low-frequency drifts were removed using a high pass filter with a cutoff of 
256 seconds (a cutoff of 100 seconds was used for functional localizer runs). 
Behavioral analyses.  Paired t-tests were used to compare reaction time 
(RT) and accuracy for trials associated with incongruent cues to those for trials 
associated with congruent cues.  Additional t-tests were conducted to determine 
whether the behavioral congruency effect (RT difference between incongruent 
cues and congruent cues) changed as a function of task switching (switch versus 
repeat), block type (attend color versus attend shape), or tasks (phonological 
versus semantic task).  All RT analyses were limited to the correct trials. The 
statistical threshold was set at p<0.0167 (alpha = 0.05, two-tailed, Bonferroni 
corrected for multiple comparisons) for all behavioral analyses.  
Voxelwise general linear model (GLM). Task-dependent changes in 
BOLD signal were modeled using separate regressors representing each 
possible combination of the block type (color, shape), cue congruency 
(congruent, incongruent) and task rule (phonological, semantic).  Each regressor 
was time-locked to the onset of the task cue.  In addition, error trials, the two 
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instruction screens informing the upcoming relevant cue dimension, and six 
head-motion parameters were included in the model as regressors-of-no-interest.  
All regressors, except those for the head-motion, were modeled by stick 
functions and convolved with SPM’s canonical hemodynamic response function. 
The GLM model was estimated for each participant separately using SPM’s first-
level, fixed-effect, analysis.  The primary contrast of interest was created for each 
participant to identify voxels exhibiting greater BOLD responses on all 
incongruent cue trials compared with congruent cue trials. All contrasts created 
at the subject-level were entered into a group-level random-effect analysis using 
a one-sample t-test against a contrast value of zero at each voxel.  The statistical 
maps were thresholded using a voxel-level threshold of p < 0.005, corrected for 
multiple comparisons at a cluster-level of p < 0.05 (family-wise error correction).  
The cluster-extent threshold was calculated based on Gaussian random field 
method implemented in SPM8 (Friston et al., 1994). 
Region of interest analysis.  Functional regions of interest (ROIs) were 
chosen to test for interactions between PFC and task-selective areas.  Because 
there was a high degree of variation across participants, the task-selective ROIs 
were identified in each participant using an independent functional localizer task.  
For the functional localizer, the statistical analysis was performed on the 
smoothed and normalized data.  Two regressors of interest indicating the type of 
task for that block (semantic task, phonological task) as well as six head-motion 
parameters as regressors-of-no-interest were included in a GLM.  The blocks 
were modeled as epochs spanning across the entire duration of the 16-second 
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block, which was then convolved with SPM’s canonical hemodynamic response 
function.  The GLM model was estimated for each participant separately using 
SPM’s first-level fixed-effect analysis. Contrasts of interest were (1) phonological 
task > semantic task, and (2) semantic task > phonological task.  
Additionally, the localization focused on the left premotor gyrus (PM) along 
the border of the inferior frontal gyrus (BA6/44) and the anterior portion of the left 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (aVLPFC) in BA47, because these areas have 
previously shown to be preferentially activated by the use of phonological rules 
versus semantic rules, respectively (Sakai and Passingham, 2006).  To ensure 
each participant’s task-selective ROIs were within these pre-specified areas (left 
PM and left aVLPFC), we used the group-level results to constrain the selection 
of subject-specific voxels.   For the phonology-sensitive area, we selected voxels 
that (1) exceeded a threshold of p < 0.05 (uncorrected) in the phonological task 
greater than semantic task contrast in that participant, and (2) was within the left 
PM binary mask generated from the group-level random-effect analysis (p < 0.05, 
FWE-corrected) for the same contrast.  Similarly, for the semantic-sensitive area, 
we selected voxels that (1) exceeded a threshold of p < 0.05 (uncorrected) in the 
semantic task greater than the phonological task contrast in the individual 
participant, and (2) was within the left aVLPFC binary mask generated from the 
group-level random-effects analysis (p < 0.05, FWE-corrected) for the same 
contrast.  The peaks for PM (-50, -8, 44) and aVLPFC (-46, 28, -10) in our group 
analysis are consistent with what others have previously reported for these tasks 
(McDermott et al., 2003; Sakai and Passingham, 2006).   
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For each subject-specific ROI identified using the localizer scans, we 
extracted the beta values separately for each of the eight conditions from the 
first-level GLM of the main task.  Since there were no significant differences in 
behavior or fMRI activation for color versus shape blocks, and our primary 
interest was the congruency effect on task-selective areas, we pooled the beta 
values across block types, resulting in 4 beta values per participant for each 
condition (phonological task/incongruent cue; phonological task/congruent cue; 
semantic task/incongruent cue; semantic task/congruent cue).  Beta values for 
these four conditions were averaged across voxels within each ROI using 
MarsBaR toolbox (Brett, 2002). 
One main hypothesis to be tested in the current study was whether the 
type of interactions that occur between the PFC and sensory or motor regions 
during selection also occur within the PFC itself, by biasing neural processing 
towards the prefrontal neurons coding abstract information needed for the 
relevant task rule over the irrelevant one.  Previous research in visual attention 
has shown the selection can be achieved in sensory and motor regions by 
enhancing relevant information, suppressing irrelevant information, or a 
combination of both (Cohen et al., 1990). To delineate the precise mechanisms 
by which the PFC resolves conflicts among abstract task rules, we first identified 
the prefrontal region that showed significant activation using the incongruent > 
congruent contrast in the group-level analysis.  This contrast identified a single 
cluster in the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG).  Next, we calculated for each 
participant the extent to which activity in the task-relevant area was increased 
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during incongruent relative to the congruent trials (“enhancement index”), as well 
as the degree to which activity in the task-irrelevant area was decreased during 
the incongruent relative to the congruent trials (“suppression index”) using beta 
values. For each index, a larger score indicates the greater enhancement or 
suppression in the task-relevant or task-irrelevant areas, respectively. We then 
tested for a correlation between these indices and the activity changes in rIFG 
(incongruent – congruent) across participants, separately for each task condition. 
The hypothesis to be tested was whether greater activity in the rIFG during 
incongruent trials would be associated with greater enhancement of relevant 
abstract information, suppression of irrelevant abstract information, or both.  
 In addition to rIFG, previous studies have suggested that parietal cortex is 
part of the cognitive control network and its activity increases concurrently with 
PFC when participants actively maintain a relevant task rule in working memory 
(Brass and von Cramon, 2002; Bunge et al., 2003) and when participants switch 
rules from one task to another (Sohn et al., 2000; Braver et al., 2003; Yeung et 
al., 2006). Thus, we also identified a region in the right inferior parietal lobule 
(rIPL) using the incongruent > congruent contrast and performed the same 
across-participant correlation analysis within that region. 
 
Multi-voxel Pattern Analysis (MVPA). The across-participant correlation analyses 
tested whether rIFG provides a top-down signal that helps to resolve conflict 
between abstract representations of task rules, by modulating activities in areas 
that process the abstract task information (semantic vs. phonological 
	   48	  
information). To further investigate the representational content of this top-down 
signal from rIFG, we used MVPA to test whether the pattern of activity within 
rIFG contains rule information, context information, or both.  This analysis was 
also performed in rIPL for comparison. 
 MVPA was performed using a linear support vector machine 
(LinearCSVMC) from LIBSVM library (Chang CC, 2011) implemented within the 
PyMVPA software package (Hanke et al., 2009).  The preprocessing procedure 
included slice-timing and head movement correction.  The resulting functional 
images were then smoothed with a 4 mm FWHM kernel.  To reduce the problem 
related to BOLD signals overlapping across temporally adjacent events, a 
univariate GLM analysis was conducted to derive condition-specific beta 
estimates for each block. For each participant, beta values pertaining to either 
the semantic task or the phonological task were estimated in each of the 40 
blocks, yielding two beta maps for each block.  Trials were modeled as events 
time-locked to the onset of the cue using a stick function, which was then 
convolved with a canonical HRF.  A constant of one for each of the 40 blocks 
was included in the model to remove the mean signal within each block. Error 
trials were excluded from analyses. In a separate GLM, a similar procedure was 
used to estimate beta values related to the color and shape contexts.  Context 
here was functionally defined as the relevant cue dimension participants were 
cued to attend to within each block.  Each of the eight trials within a block 
contributed to the estimation of beta value for that context, yielding one beta map 
for each block.  Overall, these GLM analyses yielded 40 beta maps for each task 
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condition (phonological, semantic), and 20 beta maps for each context condition 
(color, shape). 
 Classifications of task rules and contexts were performed separately 
within the rIFG and rIPL clusters derived from the incongruent > congruent 
contrast.   Each ROI was transformed back to the participant’s native space by 
applying the inverse of the normalization parameters.  This allowed us to conduct 
pattern classifications without re-sampling the individual beta maps to standard 
space.  For each participant, the pattern of beta values within each ROI was 
extracted from each of the relevant beta maps.  A leave-one-run-out procedure 
was used for cross-validation.  A classifier was trained using the beta maps from 
four of the five runs and then tested using the beta maps from the held-out run.  
Five iterations were performed so that each run was tested once. The mean 
classification accuracy for each individual was determined by averaging the 
results across five iterations.  To assess whether the classification performance 
was significantly different from chance (50%) at the group level, we first 
performed the permutation testing for each individual.  This was done by 
randomly shuffling the target feature labels in the training sets (test set was not 
included) 5000 times to simulate the null distribution for a single participant.  
From the single-subject null distribution, we then randomly selected one 
classification accuracy from each participant, averaged these across the 
participants, and repeated this step 5000 times to build the group-level null 
distribution.  The group-level significance was determined by comparing the 
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Overall, participants were significantly slower in the incongruent trials (Mean = 
1145 ms, SD = 27 ms) relative to the congruent (Mean = 1108 ms, SD = 26 ms) 
trials (t (15) = 3.341, p = 0.004).  Error rate was also significantly larger in the 
incongruent (Mean = 0.073, SD = 0.01) than the congruent (Mean = 0.053, SD = 
0.008) trials (t (15) = 2.991, p = 0.009), indicating the congruency effect on RTs 
was not a result of speed-accuracy trade-offs.  In addition, the observed 
congruency effect was not significantly different between phonological and 
semantic tasks (t (15) = 0.948, p = 0.358), between “Attend Color” and “Attend 
Shape” blocks (t (15) = 0.052, p = 0.959), between switch trials versus repeat 
trials (t (15) = 0.183, p = 0.858), or between congruent versus incongruent 
response trials based on the target word (t (15) = 1.931, p = 0.073).  These 
behavioral results indicate that the congruency experimental manipulation 
resulted in rule conflict as intended, with no interaction from other potential 
factors such as relevant cue feature or the particular primary task to be 
performed. 
 
Voxelwise GLM results 
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To identify the cognitive control networks involved in the resolution of conflicting 
abstract task representations, we performed a whole brain univariate analysis 
contrasting the incongruent trials to the congruent trials. Complementary to the 
behavioral congruency effects, a number of regions demonstrated greater 
activation in the incongruent condition compared to the congruent condition, 
including rIFG, right insula, rIPL, right putamen, right postcentral gyrus, right 
precuneus, and midbrain (Figure 2.2).  The opposite contrast (congruent > 
incongruent) did not yield any significant activation differences. Of particular note, 
the rIFG cluster located in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (MNI coordinates of 
peak: 48, 28, 15; BA 45/46) has been previously implicated in tasks that require 
inhibition of irrelevant task sets or overriding a pre-potent response (Aron et al., 
2003; Aron et al., 2004). 
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Figure 2.2. Regions showing greater activation in the incongruent condition 
compared to the congruent condition. 
 
Congruency effects on task-selective areas 
We first examined the congruency effect in areas preferentially active for the 
phonological or the semantic task using ROIs independently identified during the 
separate functional localizer scans.  Since we only analyzed correct trials where 
the conflict between task rules should have been mostly resolved by the time a 
motor response was made, we might have expected to see a strong activation in 
task-relevant areas (i.e. left PM for the phonological task and left aVLPFC for the 
semantic task), and minimal activation in task-irrelevant areas (i.e. left PM for the 
semantic task and left aVLPFC for the phonological task) equally for both 
incongruent and congruent conditions.  Alternatively, if the competition had not 
been completely resolved, then we would expect to see more activation in the 
task-irrelevant area and less activation in the task-relevant area during 
incongruent trials than during congruent trials. 
 To test these predictions, the beta values for these two ROIs were 
extracted and plotted as a function of relevant tasks and cue congruency (Figure 
2.3).  Two repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted to test for an interaction 
between cue congruency (congruent, incongruent) and task (semantic, 
phonological) separately for each ROI. As expected because these ROIs were 
functionally defined using the localizer scans, activity in the left PM ROI was 
greater in the phonological task condition than the semantic task condition (F 
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(1,15) = 8.429, p = 0.011), whereas the opposite pattern was observed in the left 
aVLPFC ROI (F (1,15) = 21.963, p < 0.001). There was no significant interaction 
between congruency and task in either ROI (left PM, F (1,15) = 0.231, p = 0.638; 
left aVLPFC, F (1,15) = 0.406, p = 0.142).  The absence of an interaction effect is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the conflict between task rules was at least 




Figure 2.3. During correct trials, the congruency of the cue did not appear to 
change the amount of activation in either the relevant or irrelevant task areas 
(both interaction results show p>0.05), indicating the competition was at least 
partially resolved.  
 
Across participants correlation between rIFG and task-selective areas 
Although there was no interaction between congruency and the amount of 
activation in task-relevant and irrelevant areas in the group-level ROI analyses, 
the possibility remained that the degree to which the conflict between task rules 
was resolved on incongruent trials could have been different across participants, 
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and that this could be related to the degree to which an individual activated the 
rIFG. Indeed, this is what we found using an across-participant correlation 
analysis.  As shown in Figure 2.4, the degree to which rIFG activation was 
increased during the incongruent trials relative to the congruent trials predicted 
the size of the enhancement effects in the task-relevant areas for the 
phonological task (left PM, r = 0.79, p < 0.001) and for the semantic task (left 
aVLPFC, r = 0.546, p = 0.029), but not the size of the suppression effects in the 
task-irrelevant areas for either the phonological task (left aVLPFC, r = -0.333, p = 
0.208) or the semantic task (left PM, r = -0.399, p = 0.126).  The same correlation 
analysis was also performed in rIPL.  The size of the increase in rIPL during 
incongruent compared to congruent trials did not predict the size of the 
enhancement in the task-relevant areas for the phonological task (left PM, r = 
0.237, p = 0.376) or for the semantic task (left aVLPFC, r = 0.426, p = 0.1), nor 
did it predict the size of the suppression in the task-irrelevant areas for the 
phonological task (left aVLPFC, r = -0.401, p = 0.124) or for the semantic task 
(left PM, r = 0.022, p = 0.936).  These results provide support for the theory that 
regions within PFC can be both the source of biasing signals and the target of 
those signals. Furthermore, the data indicates that this resolution of conflict 
among abstract task rules is accomplished by the enhancement of activity in 
brain areas representing relevant abstract information, rather than by the 
suppression of activity in areas representing irrelevant abstract information. 
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Figure 2.4. Top two graphs show data from the left BA6 region that was 
preferentially activated for the phonological task.  The bottom two graphs show 
data from the left BA47 region that was preferentially activated for the semantic 
task.  Graphs on the left shows individual differences in the degree of activation 
enhancement in the task relevant area (BA6 for the phonological task and BA47 
for the semantic task) as a function of that participant’s activation difference in 
the rIFG for incongruent versus congruent trials. Graphs on the right show 
individual differences in the degree of activation suppression in the task-
irrelevant area, again as a function of the incongruent versus congruent 
activation of the IFG.  Enhancement is defined as the difference in betas for the 
incongruent trials minus the congruent trials, and suppression is defined as the 
difference in betas for the congruent trials minus the incongruent trials.   
 
MVPA Results 
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MVPA analysis was performed to investigate the nature of the neural population 
code in rIFG that enables it to act as a bias signal. The results were in line with 
the hypothesis that patterns of activity in rIFG contain both the relevant rule 
information (mean classification accuracy for semantic versus phonological 
trials= 57.06%, p < 0.001) and contextual information (mean classification 
accuracy for color versus shape blocks = 54.22%, p = 0.019).  For comparison, 
we also conducted another MVPA using patterns of activity from rIPL.  The 
pattern of activity in rIPL yielded a significant classification result for the rule 
information (mean classification accuracy = 55.23%, p <0.001), but not for the 
contextual information (mean classification = 52.27%, p = 0.123). To summarize, 
our results indicate that both rIPL and rIFG contain information about the current 
task rule, but only rIFG activation also contains information about the context and 
only the rIFG activation is correlated with the degree to which the task-relevant 
information is enhanced.  
 
2.4. Discussion 
We used functional neuroimaging techniques to examine the mechanism 
responsible for resolving conflict between abstract representations pertaining to 
task rules: selecting the relevant abstract task rule over the irrelevant one. In 
previous studies, the mechanism by which conflict between task sets was 
resolved was indirectly tested by measuring activity in task-relevant and task-
irrelevant brain regions during task switching (Yeung et al., 2006) and during 
conflict adaptation (Egner and Hirsch, 2005).  However, one unexplored avenue 
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in previous work was that the conflict in the tasks used in those studies could 
have occurred at multiple levels of processing, ranging from stimulus 
representations, response representations, to rule representations.  Thus, an 
important feature of the current study is that the rule conflict was manipulated 
independently of the sensory features of the task cues or any motor planning 
responses triggered by the targets, enabling us to manipulate the degree of 
conflict at the task-rule level.  In the current study different features of the task 
cues were associated with either the same (congruent cues) or different task 
rules (incongruent cues).  Both congruent and incongruent cue stimuli had both 
color and shape feature dimensions. The context instruction at the beginning of 
the block unambiguously indicated which feature dimension was relevant. The 
conflict arose on incongruent trials only because of the learned association 
between the irrelevant cue dimension and the irrelevant abstract task rule, not 
because of conflict at the sensory level itself. Furthermore, we used a unique 
target word for each trial to prevent learning of an association between the target 
word and a specific response. Thus, conflict at the response level was also 
minimized.  
 Behaviorally, we found task performance was slower and less accurate in 
the incongruent condition relative to the congruent condition, suggesting that 
additional control processes were required following incongruent cues. These 
behavioral results provide strong evidence that our congruency manipulation was 
successful. Using functional neuroimaging, we also demonstrated that the 
behavioral congruency effect was accompanied by greater BOLD activity in a 
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network of regions commonly associated with cognitive control and conflict 
resolution, including lateral prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, insula, and 
subcortical areas.   
 The primary goal of the current study was to test whether the mechanisms 
involved in resolving conflict among abstract representations within the PFC were 
similar to those involved in resolving conflict among as they do with sensory and 
motor representations. It is widely believed that the PFC serves as a source of 
top-down control over other brain areas to bias processing towards goal-relevant 
sensory and motor information (Miller and Cohen, 2001). Thus, we predicted that 
conflict between abstract representations of task rules would be resolved by 
prefrontal feedback to the brain areas processing the goal-relevant, abstract 
information.  A previous study showed that when participants were subliminally 
primed to perform a different task than the one that was explicitly instructed, 
activity decreased in the brain area selective for the instructed (relevant) task and 
activity increased in the brain area selective for the primed (irrelevant) task (Lau 
and Passingham, 2007). The changes of activity during incongruent trials relative 
to congruent trials, in both that study and the current study, can be thought of as 
an index of the degree to which the participants engaged in the irrelevant task.  
In Lau and Passingham’s (2007) study, the magnitude of irrelevant task 
activation was only apparent when the conflicting task cue was low visibility and 
participants were thus unaware of the conflict.  In the current study, using highly 
visible task cues, we found the congruency of the task cues did not appear to 
change the overall strength of activation in either the task-relevant or task-
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irrelevant area, when activation differences were assessed in the group analysis, 
consistent with the previous result. However, when assessing individual 
differences in the responses during incongruent and congruent trials, a different 
interpretation emerged. The interesting question here was whether the difference 
in activity between the incongruent and congruent conditions for the task-relevant 
and task-irrelevant areas changes as a function of the degree to which different 
participants recruited PFC during incongruent trials. We tested this hypothesis by 
looking for correlations between the activation changes in task-selective areas 
and activation changes in (1) the rIFG, a functionally defined cognitive control 
locus within the ventrolateral PFC, and (2) in the rIPL, another functionally 
defined cognitive control region that is frequently concurrently activated with PFC 
during performance of cognitive control tasks (Bunge et al., 2003; Crone et al., 
2006; Yeung et al., 2006), and has been implicated in providing top-down 
modulation when the task requires spatial attention to particular location (Kastner 
et al., 1999; Corbetta et al., 2000). 
 Specifically, we found that, across participants, the degree to which the 
rIFG increased during the incongruent condition relative to the congruent 
condition predicted the magnitude of the enhancement effect in the task-relevant 
area but not the suppression effect in the task-irrelevant area. This correlation 
between the rIFG and task-relevant area activations was significant regardless of 
which of the two task rules was currently relevant. On the other hand, we did not 
find a significant correlation between rIPL activation and task-selective areas for 
either task. These observed relationships provide important insights about how 
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conflict between abstract rule representations is resolved and how it may be 
similar to or different from conflict resolution mechanisms in sensory and motor 
cortices. Classic models of “biased competition” for selective attention include 
both enhancement of relevant information and mutually inhibitory interactions 
that result in a winner-take-all outcome. While the original models were 
developed primarily based on single cell electrophysiological data, fMRI studies 
have also found evidence for suppression of irrelevant sensory information by 
selective attention within visual areas (Kastner et al., 1998).  For the abstract 
representations within PFC in the current study, such suppression, if it exists, 
appears much smaller than the enhancement of relevant information. It is 
important to note, however, that the suppressive interaction among multiple 
visual stimuli is a result of direct lateral inhibitory connections within a single 
functional area.  Suppression of activity related to irrelevant visual stimuli occurs 
when those stimuli are within the receptive fields of the same neurons. The 
neural activity patterns related to the different types of abstract representations in 
the current study (i.e. left PM and left aVLPFC) reside in separate brain areas 
that likely do not share strong inhibitory connections with each other. Thus, the 
enhancement of neural activity in one area would not necessarily be expected to 
result in inhibition of the other.  Overall, our data are in agreement with previous 
selective attention studies that showed competing sensory stimuli were resolved 
through enhancement of task-relevant target information, including selective 
attention between spatial locations (Heinze et al., 1994; Luck et al., 1997), 
stimulus features (Corbetta et al., 1991; Chawla et al., 1999) and objects 
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(O'Craven et al., 1999; Serences et al., 2004).  These previous studies 
demonstrated resolution of sensory-based stimulus conflict through neural 
enhancement of brain areas coding the relevant sensory information.  The 
current study extends these findings by showing that feedback from specific 
prefrontal regions coding the currently relevant task rule enhances the relevant 
information needed to perform that task, even when that relevant information is 
neither sensory nor motor and is represented by neural populations that are also 
within the prefrontal cortex. Furthermore, the lack of a significant correlation for 
rIPL also suggests that rIFG may be the primary loci of cognitive control that 
provides top-down modulation when it comes to resolution of conflict among 
abstract representations. The rIPL may provide feedback more specifically for the 
control of sensory representations. 
 To better understand the nature of the bias signal from rIFG, we 
conducted MVPA to investigate the representational content within this area.  
One possibility was that rIFG could have represented information about the 
currently relevant rule, which then would drive increases of activity in brain areas 
that code the abstract information pertaining to that relevant rule. Alternatively, 
rIFG could have represented the currently relevant contextual information (i.e., 
color or shape block). This contextual information, combined with particular cue-
stimulus input, could have, in turn, driven changes of activity in brain areas 
representing the abstract information pertaining to the rule. Other alternatives 
were that rIFG could have represented both rule and contextual information, or 
neither. Successful MVPA classification indicates that the patterns of activity 
	   62	  
within this region spatially encode information about the representational content 
of interest. Our results indicate that rIFG represents both contextual and rule 
information. In contrast, the rIPL appears to represent rule information, but not 
context. The MVPA results are consistent with previous studies that showed IPL 
was involved in retrieving and maintaining rule information in working memory 
(Bunge et al., 2003; Crone et al., 2006).  In relation to the across-participant 
correlation result, however, it appears that rIPL is not the source of the top-down 
signal that biases competition of abstract representations towards the relevant 
one. The results indicate that rIFG biases selection of the appropriate abstract 
task representations according to both the cue and the current, more temporally 
extended context. In contrast, the currently relevant rule representations, or 
perhaps the bound sensory features of both color and shape that were presented 
to instruct the relevant rule for the current trial, may be represented in the rIPL, 
but it does not appear to play a direct causal role in the selection of the relevant 
over the irrelevant abstract information.   
 In conclusion, we have shown that when there is conflict between abstract 
rules, rIFG mediates that conflict by enhancing activity in brain areas 
representing relevant information, rather than by suppressing activity in brain 
areas representing irrelevant information. The rIFG has previously been 
implicated in multiple types of cognitive control processes, including motor 
inhibition (Aron et al., 2004) and reflexive attentional reorienting (Corbetta et al., 
2008).  Previous research has also suggested that different subregions of rIFG 
could have different roles in cognitive control (for review see Waskom et al., 
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2014). The current study suggests a general mechanism by which this region 
might exert these multiple types of control, namely by integrating recent (cue) 
and more temporally distant (context) information in order to represent 
information needed to selectively enhance other relevant information in the 
presence of conflicting irrelevant information, regardless of whether that 
information is sensory, motor, or abstract.   
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3. Chapter 3: Separate Cognitive Control Resources Recruited for 
Resolving Switching- vs. Congruence-induced Rule Conflicts  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 To achieve behavioral goals, cognitive control permits flexible use of 
limited cognitive resources by configuring information processing according to 
the currently relevant task rule.  This control is particularly important when the 
task rules are frequently shifting or when resolution of conflicting task rules is 
required.  One central question regarding cognitive control is how the brain 
determines that cognitive control is needed and then brings those resources to 
bear in order to resolve the conflict.  The conflict-monitoring account proposes 
that the demand of cognitive control may be evaluated by a conflict-monitoring 
unit (the anterior cingulate cortex), which detects any type of conflict in 
information processing and then relays the conflict signal to a strategic control 
unit (the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), which then resolves conflict by enhancing 
the task-relevant information (Botvinick et al., 2001).  By this account, the 
conflict-monitoring unit is sensitive to the general level of conflict, regardless the 
way in which conflicts might be generated.  Recently, such a “domain-general” 
conflict-control account has been called into question.  Several studies have 
combined different types of conflict, such as stimulus-based Stroop conflict and 
response-based Simon conflict, to assess whether control processes triggered by 
one type of conflict facilitated the resolution of another (Egner et al., 2007).  It 
was shown that the conflict-driven control mechanisms recruited by one type of 
conflict does not affect the resolution of another.  Moreover, the stimulus-based 
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Stroop conflict modulated the activity in parietal cortex and the response-based 
Simon conflict modulated the activity in premotor area.  Such a pattern of results 
support a conflict-specific cognitive control account in which separate control 
resources are recruited to resolve each type of conflict independently.  If conflict 
among sensory representations and motor representations are resolved via their 
own cognitive control resources, then this evokes the question whether different 
sources of conflict regarding abstract representations of non-sensory rule 
information might be resolved in a similar conflict-specific manner. 
 The mechanism of cognitive control for resolving conflict associated with 
task rules has been extensively studied using cued task-switching paradigms 
(e.g., Logan and Zbrodoff, 1979; Sohn et al., 2000; Crone et al., 2006; Yeung et 
al., 2006) or congruence paradigms that utilize bivalent stimuli, i.e., stimuli with 
features associated with two different tasks (e.g., Duncan-Johnson and Kopell, 
1981; Botvinick et al., 2001; Bunge et al., 2002; Brass and von Cramon, 2004; 
Kunde and Wuhr, 2006; Kim et al., 2013).  The former paradigm requires the 
participant to frequently switch between two or more task rules based on the 
instruction given by a task cue (e.g. perform either parity or magnitude judgments 
on digits based on the cue presented) while the latter requires the participants to 
remember the current context to select between two possible tasks evoked by 
the two dimensions of the bivalent stimulus (e.g. in Stroop task, the color evokes 
color naming task and the word evokes word reading task, and the relevant task 
is dependent on the current context). Thus, in both cases, there is a conflict 
between a relevant and an irrelevant task rule, and participants are required to 
	   66	  
select the relevant rule to meet the current behavioral goal.  However, the source 
of conflict originates differently. In the task-switching paradigm, the conflict arises 
from the residual activity related to a previously performed task rule (Allport et al., 
1994; Yeung et al., 2006) and the control process related to setting up for the 
new task and disengaging from the previous task (Rogers R.D., 1995; Monsell, 
2003). In a congruence paradigm, however, the conflict arises when different 
dimensions of the stimulus are simultaneously mapped onto conflicting rule 
representations (Kornblum et al., 1990; Kornblum and Lee, 1995).  Hence, an 
unanswered question is whether different sources of conflict involved in task 
rules are associated with dissociable, conflict-specific cognitive control 
mechanisms or whether a single, domain-general cognitive control mechanism is 
responsible for resolving all types of task conflict. According to the conflict-
specific account, each source of task conflict would be resolved via its own 
dedicated cognitive control mechanism, each of which operates independently 
from the other.  In contrast, according to a domain-general account, a single 
cognitive control mechanism would work flexibly to resolve all sources of task 
conflict.   
 In the current study, we wanted to examine the generality of cognitive 
control mechanisms for resolving different sources of task conflict, namely the 
switching-induced and the congruency-induced task conflicts.  Task conflict is 
defined as competition between rules that differ in their cognitive operations, 
which occur regardless of the overlap among sensory stimuli and among 
responses.  
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 To identify and directly compare the cognitive control processes for 
resolving switching-induced versus congruence-induced task-rule conflicts, we 
deployed two strategies.  First, we used the same data as was collected for the 
results reported in Chapter 2, for which the task involved conflict between task 
rules that was manipulated independently of the sensory features of the task 
cues or any motor planning response triggered by the targets. This was done 
through training participants to associate different dimensions (color and shape) 
of the cue with either the same rule (congruent cues) or different ones 
(incongruent cues), combined with the use of trial-unique words to which the 
rules were applied. This allowed us to examine the cognitive control mechanisms 
for as-pure-as-possible task rule representations, which had not been possible in 
previous studies (Bunge et al., 2003; Yeung et al., 2006).  Second, specific to the 
goal of examining the specificity of conflict resolution control mechanism, we 
independently manipulated task switching (switch/repeat) and cue congruency 
(incongruent/congruent) using a factorial design within a single experimental 
protocol.  This allowed us to directly assess differential neural activation involved 
in resolving switching-induced versus congruency-induced conflict. 
 
3.1.1. Materials and Methods 
The same data set as Chapter 2 was used for this investigation; therefore all 
task, stimulus and participant information is identical.  It is repeated here for the 
reader’s ease of reference.  
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Participants.  Sixteen (12 females, 4 males) right-handed, healthy young adults 
between 18 and 35 years of age (mean 20±2.5) participated the study.  All 
participants were native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, no history of head injury, substance abuse, neurological or psychiatric 
disorders, and were not taking any medications at the time of the study.  The 
protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Boards of the Johns Hopkins 
University and the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions.  All participants provided 
written informed consent. 
 Experimental Procedure.  Participants were asked to make either a 
phonological or a semantic judgment for a visually presented word, as quickly as 
possible, while maintaining accuracy. The phonological rule required the 
participants to indicate, by pressing one of two buttons, whether the presented 
word contained two syllables or not. The semantic rule required the participants 
to indicate whether the meaning of the word referred to a concrete object or not.  
Left/Right button response mappings were counterbalanced across subjects.  To 
equate difficulty between the two task rules, the word stimuli were selected using 
criteria similar to that of Sakai and Passingham (2006). All the word stimuli were 
nouns with written frequency over 15, taken from the Medical Research Council 
Psycholinguistic Database 
(http://websites.psychology.uwa.edu.au/school/MRCDatabase/uwa_mrc.htm).  
Half of the words had two syllables and the other half had one or three syllables; 
half had abstract meaning with a concreteness rating below 300 and the other 
half had concrete meaning with a concreteness rating above 500, according to 
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the database. Different word stimuli were used in the pre-task training and 
scanning session, and none of the word stimuli was repeated during the 
scanning session. 
Training sessions. The purpose of the training sessions was to 
experimentally manipulate the conflict level associated with the task cue.  An 
example trial is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The applicable rule to apply was 
indicated by a task cue presented at the beginning of each trial.  Importantly, 
participants trained on the two dimensions of the task cue (color and shape) on a 
computer prior to the scanning session. There were two separate training 
sessions, one for each cue dimension.  In the color training session, participants 
responded according to the color dimension of the cue (e.g., green indicates the 
semantic task and blue indicates the phonological task), and in the shape training 
session, participants responded according to the shape dimension of the cue 
(e.g., circle indicates the semantic task and triangle indicates the phonological 
task).  The task cue meaning and the rule assignment for both training sessions, 
as well as the order of the training sessions were counterbalanced across 
participants.  Task instruction and a brief practice consisting of 24 trials were 
given at the beginning of each training session to make sure the participants 
understood the stimuli and procedures.  Participants were instructed to respond 
according to the relevant cue dimension (i.e., either shape or color), which 
remained constant over the entire course of the training sessions.   To ensure 
both feature dimensions of the cue were strongly associated with their 
corresponding tasks, participants performed 320 trials over the course of 30 
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minutes on each dimension (an hour in total for both the color and shape training 
sessions) in a quiet laboratory room.  A self-paced break was provided after 
every 64 trials. For each trial, the sequence began with a 300-ms cue indicating 
the upcoming task, followed by a 300 ms delay.  A target word then appeared 
and remained on screen until a response was made or the 2000 ms time limit 
was reached.  After each response, feedback was presented for 300 ms to 
indicate whether the response was “Correct”, “Incorrect” or “Too slow”.  The next 
trial began after a fixed interval of 3000 ms. 
 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) session.  After the training 
sessions, participants performed a brief practice of 64 trials outside of the 
scanner approximately 20 minutes before the scan began. Inside the scanner, 
participants performed 5 runs of 64 trials each of the same semantic and 
phonological tasks.  For each run, both in the practice and during scanning, trials 
were blocked into four “Color Blocks” (color was the relevant dimension), which 
alternated with four “Shape Blocks” (shape was the relevant dimension).  Blocks 
were separated by a 11s rest period during which a fixation cross was presented. 
A 2-second instruction screen was presented at the beginning of each block 
(“Attend Color” or “Attend Shape”) to inform the participants of the relevant cue 
dimension for that block.  After the instruction screen, eight trials were presented 
using the identical trial sequence as previously described for the training phase, 
with the exception that the target word remained on the screen for the entire 
2000 ms. Participants were told to focus on that cue dimension (color or shape) 
until the next instruction screen was presented.  There were equal numbers of 
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trials for the four experimental conditions based on the congruency of the cue 
(congruent or incongruent) and task switching (switch or repeat), and the 
conditions were fully-crossed with number of phonological task versus semantic 
tasks and left versus right response buttons. Switch and repeat trials were 
defined within the context of a color or shape block.  The first trial of every block 
was eliminated from the analysis, because the switching or repeating of the 
color/shape context for those initial trials would have added noise to the analysis. 
The participants held one response button box in each hand, which sent the 
responses to a Cedrus RB-610 Response Box (Cedrus, San Pedro, CA) via fiber 
optic cables.  Reaction time (RT) was measured from the onset of the target 
word until a response was made. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. (A) Example of trial events progression, and (B) schematic drawing of 
task cues and their associated task rules.  Each task cue had two dimensions: 
color and shape. For a given cue, each dimension could either be associated 
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with the same task rule (congruent cues) or with different task rules (incongruent 
cues). During the training phase, the participants only needed to respond 
according to one of the two cue dimensions for the entire training session (320 
trials), and then to repeat the same procedure based on the other cue dimension 
(320 trials).  During the scanning session, the relevant cue dimension was 
instructed at the beginning of each block (“Attend Color” or “Attend Shape”). The 
relevant dimension remained constant within a block (8 trials per block), but 
alternated across blocks. 
fMRI data acquisition and pre-processing.  fMRI scanning was conducted 
at the F. M. Kirby Research Center for Functional Brain Imaging in the Kennedy 
Krieger Institute (Baltimore, MD) on a 3.0T Philips Intera scanner equipped with 
32-channel SENSE head coil.   High-resolution T1-weighted anatomical images 
were collected using a MP-RAGE sequence (150 axial slices, TR = 7.9 ms, TE = 
3.7 ms, flip angle = 8°, matrix = 212 x 172, voxel size of 1 x 1 x 1 mm).  Whole 
brain T2*-weighted functional images were collected in an ascending sequential 
fashion, using an echo-planar imaging sequence (35 axial slices, TR = 2000 ms, 
TE = 3.7 ms, flip angle = 70°, in-plane resolution of 2.5 mm in 80 x 80 matrix, 
slice thickness = 2.5 mm, with a 0.5mm gap).   
All preprocessing and statistical analyses were done using SPM8 
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging). The first 6 volumes of each run were 
discarded to allow for scanner equilibration.  The remaining functional image 
volumes were corrected for differences in slice acquisition timing using sinc 
interpolation, realigned to the first image volume to correct for head motion. The 
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anatomical image was first co-registered to the mean of the motion-corrected 
functional images, and then it was segmented and spatially normalized to the 
tissue probability maps included in the SPM8 toolbox using both linear and non-
linear transformations.  The normalization parameters  (i.e. deformation field) 
derived from the anatomical image were then applied to all the functional images.  
In this step, the functional images were re-sampled to the same dimension (1.5 
mm cubic voxels) as the anatomical images.  Finally, the functional images were 
smoothed with an 8 mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.  
Temporal autocorrelation was corrected using a first-order autoregressive model, 
and low-frequency drifts were removed using a high pass filter with a cutoff of 
256 seconds. 
Behavioral analyses.  A 2x2 ANOVA with “cue congruency” 
(congruent/incongruent) and “task switch” (switch/repeat) as within-subject 
factors was performed on both the RT and accuracy data.  Because the first trial 
of each color or shape block cannot be categorized as either a switch or a repeat 
trial, we excluded these trials  as well as error trials from all behavioral analyses. 
The statistical threshold was set at p<0.05 (two-tailed). 
To investigate whether individuals who are better at switching between 
rules also are better at resolving incongruence of the cue, an across-participant 
correlation analysis was performed between the switch cost (switch trial RT – 
repeat trial RT) and the incongruency cost (incongruent trial RT – congruence 
trial RT) for the 16 participants. 
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Voxelwise General Linear Model (GLM). Task-dependent changes in 
BOLD signal were modeled using separate regressors for each of the four 
conditions (incongruent_switch, incongruent_repeat, congruent_switch, 
congruent_repeat).  In addition, the first trial on every block, error trials, the two 
instruction screens informing the upcoming relevant cue dimension, and six 
head-motion parameters were included in the model as regressors-of-no-interest.  
All regressors, except those for the head-motion, were modeled by stick 
functions and convolved with SPM’s canonical hemodynamic response function. 
The general linear model was estimated for each participant separately using 
first-level (fixed-effect) analysis.  For each participant, contrasts were created for 
each of the four experimental conditions using a one-sample t test against a 
contrast value of zero (i.e. the experimental conditions versus implicit baseline 
(fixation). The four first-level individual contrasts were then included in the 
corresponding cells in the second-level (random-effect) factorial design. A 2 x 2 
full factorial design was used with “cue congruency” and “task switch” as two 
within-subject factors. Statistical t-test maps were constructed for all switch trials 
compared with repeat trials, and for all incongruent trials compared with 
congruent trials, and interaction of the two factors.  The statistical maps were 
thresholded using a voxel-level threshold of p < 0.005, corrected for multiple 
comparisons at a cluster-level of p < 0.05 (family-wise error correction).  The 
cluster-extent threshold was calculated based on Gaussian random field method 
implemented in SPM8 (Friston et al., 1994). 
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Conjunction analysis. To examine whether the neural circuit involved in 
the main effect of switching and the neural circuit involved in the main effect of 
cue congruency overlap with each other (i.e. whether there are common brain 
regions are involved for both effects), we further performed a conjunction 
analysis (Nichols et al., 2005) using SPM “conjunction null” option.  By 
performing a statistical test on the intersection of two thresholded statistical 
maps, a conjunction analysis reveals whether there is brain region commonly 
activated across tasks.   Both contrasts (Switch> Repeat, Incongruent > 
Congruent) were thresholded at p<0.071 for the conjunction analysis, which 
renders an overall threshold at 0.071 x 0.071 = 0.005. 
Furthermore, we performed two additional conjunction analyses to 
investigate possible overlap in activations between the interaction effect and the 
main effect of incongruence cues (incongruent_switch> congruent_switch) > 
(congruent_rep > incongruent_rep) ∩ (incongruent > congruent), and between 
the interaction effect and the main effect of task switching (incongruent_switch> 
congruent_switch) > (congruent_rep > incongruent_rep) ∩ (switch > repeat). 
 
Region of interest analyses.  To further characterize the activation profile 
in the clusters identified by the interaction contrast from the GLM analysis, 
region-of-interest (ROI) analyses were performed.  Parameter estimates were 
extracted from each ROI and averaged across the area using Marsbar (Brett et 
al., 2002). Planned paired t-tests on simple main effects were performed with an 
alpha of 0.05. 




For the RT data, 2-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of cue 
congruency on RT (F (1,15) = 9.77; p=0.006): participants were slower on 
incongruent trials compared to congruent trials (1140 vs. 1108 ms), and a main 
effect of task switch (F (1,15)) = 27.117; p<0.001): participants were slower on 
switch trials compared to repeat trials (1159 vs. 1089 ms).  However, there was 
no significant interaction (F (1,15)) = 0.009; p=0.924) between cue congruency 
and task switch (Figure 3.2).  No significant correlation was found between 
switch cost and incongruence cost (r = -0.03, p = 0.902) across participants. 
 For the accuracy data, there was a main effect of cue congruency (F 
(1,15) = 9.654; p = 0.006): participants were less accurate on incongruent trials 
than on congruent trials (92.67% vs. 94.7%), but accuracy did not differ 
significantly (F (1,15) = 1.354, p = 0.261) between the switch and repeat trials 
(92.96% vs. 94.4%).  The interaction was marginally significant (F (1,15) = 3.883, 
p = 0.065), showing that the cue congruency effect was slightly greater for switch 
trials than repeat trials.  Accuracy and RT data were shown in Table 3.1 and 
Figure 3.2. 
 
Table 3.1 Behavioral performance by trial type 
 
Trial&Type
Con-Swt Con-Rep Incon-Swt Incon-Rep
RT(sec) 1139(28) 1077(25) 1178(31) 1101(25)
Accuracy(%) 94.10(1.17) 94.92(0.85) 91.58(1.19) 94.19(1.12)
Figure 3.2.  RTs and accuracy are plotted separately for congruent cue 
and incongruent cue trial, for both rule repetitions and rule switches.  RTs are 
shown for correct responses only.  
 
Neuroimaging results 
Common and specific neural correlates underlying switching and congruency 
effects
We first identified brain areas associated with the main effect of switching 
between task rules.  Figure 3.3 shows the results of Switch > Repeat contrast in 
blue color, which revealed a network of cognitive control regions that included left 
precentral gyrus, pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA)/SMA, and left inferior 
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found in the reverse contrast.  Next, we identified the brain areas associated with 
the main effect of cue congruency.  The Incongruent > Congruent contrast 
(Figure 3.3, red color) revealed a network of regions that included anterior 
cingulate gyrus (ACC), right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), right IPL, right insula, 
right precuneus, and midbrain.  No significant activation was found in the reverse 
contrast.  
 A conjunction analysis was performed to identify whether there are 
common brain regions showing activation for both main effects of switching and 
cue congruency.  The conjunction analysis between the “Incongruent > 
Congruent” AND “Switch > Repeat” contrasts revealed no significant activation 
overlap between these two contrasts, suggesting there was no common areas 
underlying these two main effects. 
 
Figure 3.3. Areas active for resolving cue congruency (red) and for switching 
between task rules (blue).   
 
Neural interaction between switching and congruency. 
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The interaction contrast of between Switching (switch/repeat) and Congruency 
(congruent/incongruent) showed significant activation in left precentral gyrus 
(BA6, MNI: -32, -13, 66; t (16) = 3.86), the opercular part of left IFG (oper_IFG, 
MNI: -40, 14, 21; t (16) = 3.64), the orbital part of left IFG (BA47, MNI: -44, 21, -
11; t (16) = 3.93), fusiform gyrus/Middle Occipital Gyrus (FG/MOG, MNI: 28, -82, 
-17, t (16) = 3.56), and thalamus (MNI: -2, -6, 16; t (16) = 4.37) (Figure 3.4).  To 
understand what was driving these interactions, we then performed ROI analyses 
to examine the activation patterns within each cluster.  These ROI analyses 
revealed that, for all ROIs, the increase in activity for incongruent over congruent 
trials was greater during switching (all p values < 0.05).  In the thalamus, the 
congruency effect was actually reversed during repeat trials such that activity 
was significantly greater for congruent than incongruent conditions during repeat 
trials (p = 0.009).  In the other ROIs, congruency effects were only marginally 
significant in the opercular IFG (p = 0.059), IFG/BA47 (p = 0.059), precentral 
gyrus (p = 0.09), and fusiform gyrus (p = 0.062).  No significant activation was 
found in the reverse interaction contrast.  Thus, these comparisons showed that 
all these areas were more active on incongruent trials compared to the congruent 
trials for the switch trials, but not for the repeat trials. The observed interaction 
was thus primarily attributable to a relative increase of activity on 
switch_incongruent trials compared to all other conditions.   
 Finally, conjunction analyses were also performed to investigate possible 
overlaps in activations between interaction effects and each of the main effects 
(i.e. switch > repeat, as well as incongruent > congruent).  The conjunction 
analyses did not show any suprathreshold voxels, indicating that no area 
demonstrated both a main effect of either congruency or switching and an 





































































Figure 3.4.  Neural interactions between task switching (switch/repeat) and cue 
congruency (incongruent/congruent).  Left thalamus, left precentral gyrus, left 
orb_IFG, left oper_IFG, right fusiform gyrus were significantly activated by the 
interaction contrast “Switch (Incongruent > Congruent) > Repeat (Congruent > 
Incongruent).  Beta weights in the four experimental conditions were extracted 
from the activated clusters and plotted.  Abbreviation: IFG: inferior frontal gyrus; 
Oper_IFG: the opercular part of the inferior frontal gyrus.  
 
3.2. Discussion 
The cognitive control mechanism for conflict resolution regarding task rules has 
been commonly examined using either a task-switching paradigm or a 
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relevant and an irrelevant rule; however, the sources of the conflict are different.  
In the present fMRI study, we show for the first time, by manipulating the levels of 
conflict for switching and congruency independently within a single paradigm, 
that these two sources of task conflict recruit different neural circuits for conflict 
resolution, implicating conflict-specific cognitive control mechanisms that work 
separately to resolve each task conflict types.   
 Regarding the behavioral data, we found a robust switch cost resulted 
from switching between two task rules across trials, this phenomenon is 
commonly reported in task-switching literature (for a review, see Monsell, 2003).  
In our experiment, the switch cost was 70 ms, and there was no significant 
difference of switch cost between the congruent and incongruent condition.  The 
extra time needed for the switch trials is likely to reflect the time-consuming 
process of reconfiguring the brain system to engage the new task and/or 
disengage the old task (Rogers R.D., 1995) as well as the overcoming of  
“proactive” interference associated with the previously relevant but currently 
irrelevant task (Allport et al., 1994).  Note that we recognize that the sources of 
switch costs has been hotly debated for decades (Monsell, 2003; Sakai, 2008), 
but we don’t make theoretical claims about what task-switching components 
contribute to the switch costs since they were not within the scope of this study.  
In addition to the switch cost, a behavioral incongruence cost was also 
observed resulting from different rules being activated by the relevant dimension 
and the irrelevant dimension of the cue.  The incongruence cost was measured 
39 ms and there was no significant difference of incongruent cost for the switch 
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condition and the repeat condition. The manipulation of incongruent versus 
congruent cues at the task level by using trial unique target stimuli and no fixed 
stimulus-response mappings is a novel feature of our present study.  By having 
participants associate different dimensions (color and shape) of the cue with 
ether the same rule (congruent cues) or different ones (incongruent cues), 
combined with the use of trial-unique words to which the rules were applied, we 
ensure the conflict between task rules was manipulated independently of the 
sensory features of the task cues or any motor planning response triggered by 
the targets. As the currently appropriate context (color or shape) changes 
frequently across blocks, a momentary lapse of attention control can cause the 
involuntary processing of the task rule associated with the irrelevant cue 
dimension, which leads to conflict at a task-specific level and incongruence cost.  
Finally, we examined the interaction between these two sources of task-rule 
conflict.  We found additive effects of switching-induced and incongruency-
induced conflict, but not an interactive effect.  Given that each conflict was 
manipulated independently in a factorial manner, the absence of interaction 
suggests a dissociation of the two sources of task conflict.   
 Once we established that the sources of the conflict are independent from 
each other behaviorally, we could then examine the neural data to answer the 
main question, concerning whether there are dissociable conflict-specific control 
mechanisms preferentially involved in resolving one source of task conflict over 
the other, or a single control mechanism flexibly involved in resolving different 
sources of task conflict.  The fMRI results are in line with the conflict-specific 
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hypothesis: we found switching-induced and incongruency-induced conflict 
recruit distinct sets of brain regions.  Specifically, the control-related brain regions 
sensitive to switching-induced conflict were primarily left-lateralized and included 
precentral gyrus, pre-SMA/SMA and IPL.  On the other hand, the control-related 
brain regions sensitive to incongruency-induced conflict were primarily right-
lateralized, and included ACC, IFG, IPL, and insula.  Our conjunction analysis 
between the two main effect contrasts “Switch > Repeat” and “Incongruent > 
Congruent” showed that there is no anatomical overlap of activation specific to 
these two sources of conflict, which provides further support for the conflict-
specific hypothesis.   
 Our finding that task switching activates a fronto-parietal network in the left 
hemisphere is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Badre and Wagner, 2006; 
Kim et al., 2011; Muhle-Karbe et al., 2014; Vallesi et al., 2015).  In a recent 
study, Vallesi et al. (2015) demonstrated that the brain lateralization observed in 
task-switching is independent of the specific tasks to be performed (i.e., verbal or 
spatial).  Interestingly, we also found cue incongruence activates a fronto-parietal 
network in the right hemisphere as well as ACC in the midline.  According to the 
conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001), the ACC detects the presence 
of conflict and sends signals to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which 
in turn biases the system toward the task-relevant information.  However, the 
right-lateralized front-parietal network involved in resolving task conflict induced 
by incongruent cues is an interesting finding.  Previous studies have shown right 
IFG is directly involved in response inhibition (Aron et al., 2004, 2014).  Similarly, 
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an Activation Likelihood Estimation meta-analysis of Go/No-go tasks also have 
reported a mainly right-lateralized network associated with response inhibition, 
including the IFG (BA44/45), IPL (BA40), and the superior medial frontal gyrus 
(BA6) (Buchsbaum et al., 2005).  However, in our present study, we specifically 
eliminated conflict caused by learned stimulus-response associations by using 
different target words for every trial.  In addition, the behavioral results also 
showed no effect of response congruency when we examined the RT associated 
with incongruent words (the correct response for the word is the same for either 
tasks) versus congruent words (the correct response for the word is different for 
either tasks) (the analysis was not shown in the current paper).  Thus, the current 
study showed evidence that the right fronto-parietal network, particularly rIFG, 
may play a more general role of maintaining the context to bias selection of the 
relevant rule over the irrelevant ones, rather than response inhibition per se.   
 This lateralization that we observed in our study may reflect the sustained 
versus transient components of cognitive control processes needed for 
successfully resolving incongruency-induced and switching-induced conflict, 
respectively.  Using a hybrid block and event-related paradigm, Braver et al. 
(2003) demonstrated that the sustained cognitive control component during task 
switching obtained from contrasting mixed-task blocks to single-task blocks 
primarily activates right-lateralized frontoparietal brain regions.  In contrast, the 
trial-by-trial transient cognitive control component during task switching obtained 
from contrasting task-switch trials to task-repeat trials primarily activates left-
lateralized frontoparietal brain regions.   In relation to our study, to successfully 
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resolve the incongruency-induced conflict, participants were required to actively 
maintain the currently relevant context (color or shape) in working memory to 
bias selection of the relevant task rule. This is conceptually analogous to the 
sustained cognitive control process in which task contexts or multiple task sets 
are actively maintained in working memory.  On the other hand, the switching-
induced conflict is more likely to recruit a trial-by-trial transient control process 
that involves the internal reconfiguration of task set or updating the appropriate 
stimulus-response mappings.  In this context, the distinct brain networks for 
resolving the switching-induced and incongruency-induced conflict that we found 
in our study may reflect two different modes of cognitive control – one requires 
sustained maintenance of context (color/shape) to select the appropriate rule for 
the current trial, and the other one requires flexible update of task rule 
representations. 
 In the whole-brain analysis, we obtained neural interaction effects 
between task switch and congruence in the precentral gyrus, IFG/BA47, the 
opercular section of IFG, and fusiform gyrus. Planned comparisons showed that 
these areas were more active on incongruent trials compared to the congruent 
trials for the switch trials, but not for the repeat trials. Therefore, the observed 
interaction was thus primarily attributable to a relative increase of activity on 
switch_incongruent trials compared to all other conditions.  In addition, the 
conjunction analyses between the interaction effect and the two main effects 
showed no overlap of activations.  Taken together, these patterns of results 
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suggest that these areas are only recruited when both switching and resolving 
incongruency of tasks are required. 
 In conclusion, by factorially combining task switching with cue congruency 
within a single design, our study revealed that there are distinct neural circuits 
involved in resolving conflict from switching between task rules and from 
choosing between conflicting task-rules according to context.  These results 
support the “conflict-specific” hypothesis that different sources of task conflict 
recruit dissociable cognitive control networks.  In addition, there were also areas 
that were preferentially engaged specifically when both types of conflict were 
present, but not when only one or the other was present, which lends support to 
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4. Chapter 4: Modulation of Switch Cost and Incongruence Cost by 
Proportion Conflict Manipulation 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we have demonstrated that different types of task 
conflict, i.e. conflict induced by frequent switching between different task rules 
(switching-induced task conflict) and conflict induced by having stimulus features 
associated with two different task rules (incongruence-induced task conflict), 
recruit separate brain networks for conflict resolution.  One remaining question is 
whether the recruitment of anatomically distinct brain networks indicates that 
different cognitive control mechanisms are involved for resolving switching-
induced task conflict versus incongruence-induced task conflict.  Previous 
literature on conflict resolution and cognitive control has described two forms of 
control, proactive and reactive control, that are separated in terms of their 
cognitive properties and brain activity (Braver et al., 2003; Braver et al., 2007).  
Proactive control is a sustained form of control that can be engaged when one 
anticipates occurrence of conflict, allowing rapid response by actively maintaining 
task-relevant information in working memory.  Reactive control is a transient form 
of control that can be engaged when the occurrence of a conflict event is 
unpredictable and triggers the reactivation of required task-relevant information in 
a transient manner.  Therefore, despite that both forms of control are adequate to 
correct task performance, there are some situations in which one mode of control 
is preferentially engaged.  To answer the question whether different cognitive 
control mechanisms are involved in resolving switching- versus incongruence-
induced conflict, we can modulate the task context to encourage the adoption of 
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proactive control for one conflict type, and test (1) whether such manipulation of 
cognitive control have equal effects on both conflict types and (2) whether control 
recruited by one type of conflict were to facilitate the resolution of the other 
conflict type.  
 
Congruence cost and switch cost in task conflict 
The complex and ever-changing environment we live in requires the 
human ability to select the appropriate behavioral option amidst other 
inappropriate competitors, as well as the ability to flexibly adapt our behavior to 
meet the new environmental demands.  To achieve these, cognitive control 
configures information processing according to the currently relevant task rule 
that determines appropriate behavior.  In the cognitive control literature, one 
common strategy used to study the mechanism of cognitive control is to measure 
task performance in incongruence tasks, where two different processing streams 
compete for behavior.  For example, in a classical Stroop color naming task 
(Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991), participants are required to name the color of the 
ink in which the words are printed.  Reaction times (RTs) are reliably larger for 
trials in which the name of the printed word is incongruent with its color (e.g., the 
word RED printed in green) than it is not (e.g., the word RED printed in red).  The 
difference of RT (incongruent – congruent) is often referred as the incongruence 
cost.  While the incongruence cost found in the Stroop task is often thought to 
reflect response conflict due to the automaticity of reading (e.g. Duncan-Johnson 
and Kopell, 1981; Cohen et al., 1990; MacLeod, 1991), it has also been 
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suggested that task conflict partially contributes to the Stroop interference effects 
due to the fact that the word stimulus may, in itself, cue a reading task rather 
than the (required) color-naming task, regardless of the specific word (e.g. 
MacLeod and MacDonald, 2000; Brown and Besner, 2001; Goldfarb and Henik, 
2007). 
Another commonly used means to study cognitive control mechanisms, 
particularly in the context of task interference, is the task-switching paradigm (for 
a review, see Monsell, 2003).  In this paradigm, participants are required to shift 
between two different tasks (either predictably or signaled by a cue). The RTs 
are reliably larger following a task switch (task A àtask B), compared with a task 
repeat (task Aà task A).  The difference of RT between task-switch trials and 
task-repeat trials is referred as the switch cost, which provides a behavioral index 
of the control processes involved in reconfiguration of the brain state for the 
upcoming task as well as inhibition of the previous task set.  The current study is 
aimed to understand whether there are different cognitive control mechanism for 
resolving task conflict in regards to the incongruence and task-switching costs. 
According to the conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001), the 
adjustment of cognitive control is served by anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) which 
detects the presence of conflict within the system, and then relays the conflict 
signals to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which exerts top-down control 
by biasing information processing towards the task-relevant representations in 
other parts of the brain.  Two well-known manipulations have been used as 
support for the conflict monitoring theory.  The first, sequential conflict adaptation 
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effects are defined by a reduction in the interference effects on a current trial 
when preceded by an incongruent trial compared to when preceded by a 
congruent trial (Gratton et al., 1992).  The second, proportion congruent effects 
are defined by a reduction in the interference effects in a block with a high 
proportion of incongruent trials, compared to a block with low proportion of 
incongruent trials (Logan and Zbrodoff, 1979).  The same block-wise proportion 
manipulation can also be applied to task-switching paradigm by manipulating the 
frequencies of switch versus repeat trials. In general, smaller switching costs 
have previously been observed in blocks with high proportion of switch trials 
(75% switch and 25% repeat) compared to blocks with low proportion of switch 
trials (25% switch and 75% repeat) (e.g. Dreisbach et al., 2002; Dreisbach and 
Haider, 2006; Schneider and Logan, 2006).   
 
Specificity of conflict control 
One recurring issue with conflict control is the generality of the cognitive 
control across different conflict types.  In the conflict-monitoring model, the 
conflict-control loop is considered to be “conflict-nonspecific”, such that the 
monitoring component is sensitive to the general level of conflict within the 
system, regardless of the conflict types. On the other hand, there have been 
studies arguing that conflict control can be conflict-specific.  A number of studies 
have examined the specificity of cognitive control using proportion congruence 
and/or conflict adaptation effects in the context of combining interference tasks 
involving different conflict types (e.g. Kunde and Wuhr, 2006; Egner, 2007; 
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Freitas et al., 2007; Verguts and Notebaert, 2009).  For instance, Egner et al. 
(2007) combined two independent sources of conflict, stimulus-based conflict 
(Stroop) and response-based conflict (Simon), within a single experiment, and 
then assessed whether control processes triggered by one type of conflict 
transferred to the resolution of another.  They found the control triggered by 
stimulus-based conflict on the previous trial resulted in resolution of stimulus-
based conflict on the current trial, but did not result in resolution of conflict for the 
response-based conflict. Similarly, the control triggered by response-based 
conflict on the previous trial resulted in resolution of response-based conflict on 
the current trial, but did not result in resolution of conflict for the stimulus-based 
conflict.  Their findings suggest that different types of conflict are probably 
mediated by independent conflict control loops that operate in parallel. 
Another suggestion regarding the specificity of control is that the 
sequential conflict adaptation and proportion congruent effects could reflect 
different cognitive control mechanisms.  For instance, Funes et al. (2010) 
combined a spatial Stroop task and a Simon task within a single paradigm.  By 
comparing the two behavioral effects in their ability to reduce interference within 
the same conflict type versus across the other conflict type, they found proportion 
congruent effects generalized from one conflict type to another, whereas the 
sequential conflict adaptation effects seemed to be conflict specific.  This 
dissociation was interpreted as evidence of different cognitive control 
mechanisms underlying the two effects. The authors further explained their 
results in the context of reactive and proactive control (Braver, 2012).  On the 
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one hand, the proportion congruence effect may be related to sustained 
adjustment of cognitive control for a whole block rather than single trial. This 
modulation of cognitive control is most commonly attributed to the adoption of the 
so-called “proactive control” strategy (the sustained active maintenance of task-
set information). Such proactive control is probably implemented after the 
participants have experienced the level of conflict on the first few trials in a block, 
which produces tonic changes to the neural pathways by enhancing the task-
relevant representations.  On the other hand, the sequential conflict adaptation 
effects operate on a trial-to-trial basis.  Since the transient adjustment of control 
is implemented in a just-in-time manner following a high interference event, it 
likely reflects reactive control.   
  
Task-switching cost and incongruence cost 
While many studies investigate the specificity of cognitive control for 
conflict resulting from competing response (e.g. Simon effect), competing 
stimulus-response associations (e.g. the classical Stroop), and competing stimuli 
properties (e.g. Flaker), very little has known about conflict involves competing 
task rules.  The present work fills this gap in the literature by focusing on two 
conflict types involves competition between task rules: task-rule incongruence 
and task-rule switching.   
When using the aforementioned interference tasks to study cognitive 
control, one often encounters the issue that task conflict and response conflict 
are confounded to some degree. Therefore, we used a variant on the same task 
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paradigm that we developed for the studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3 that 
allows us to manipulate the level of conflict at the task level, independently from 
other sources of conflict, such as the sensory properties of the task cues 
(stimulus conflict) or motor responses triggered by the targets (stimulus-response 
conflict). 
 
The current study 
The main question addressed in the current study is whether the cognitive 
control system that resolves incongruence cost and the cognitive control system 
that resolves switching cost are merely anatomically separate, as previously 
shown in Chapter 3, or are they qualitatively distinct mechanisms. To test this, 
we modulated the task context to encourage the deployment of proactive control, 
so as to examine whether such manipulation affects costs associated with cue 
incongruence and task switching in a similar fashion or not.  In addition, we 
tested whether proactive control triggers by manipulating the frequency of one 
conflict type has a domain general effect as suggested by conflict monitoring 
theory (Botvinick et al., 2001), or a conflict-specific effect.  
To do this, first, we manipulated task congruence by introducing a training 
period in which participants were trained to associate different dimensions (color 
and shape) of the cue with either the same rule (congruent cues) or different 
ones (incongruent cues), combined with the use of trial-unique words to which 
the rules were applied. This allows us to examine the cognitive control 
mechanisms governing rule representations, independently of particular stimuli or 
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responses.  Second, we independently manipulated task switching 
(switch/repeat) and cue congruency (incongruent/congruent) using a factorial 
design within a single experimental protocol.  This allows us to determine 
whether these conflict types are independent from each other (i.e. non-interactive 
effects) such that resolution of one conflict type does not result in facilitation or 
impairment of conflict resolution of the other conflict type, or they are overlapping 
conflicts (i.e. interactive effect) such that resolution of one conflict type result in 
facilitation or impairment of conflict resolution of the other. Finally, cognitive 
control was modulated using a proportion manipulation to influence costs 
associated with cue incongruence and task switching.  Switching-induced conflict 
and incongruence-induced conflict were manipulated separately such that when 
the ratios of task switches varied, the ratio of task-rule congruency was held 
constant and vice versa.  This allows us to keep the general level of conflict 





 Twenty-three (23) Johns Hopkins University undergraduates participated 
in this experiment in return for course credit. All participants reported having 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were native English speakers.  The 
protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Johns Hopkins 
University.  All participants provided written informed consent. 
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Stimuli 
 The task cues used in the current experiment had two dimensions: color 
(green/blue) and shape (circle/triangle). During the training phase, participants 
learned the meaning of the color and shape in two separate sessions.  In the 
color training session, participants responded according to the color dimension of 
the cue (e.g. green means to perform a phonological task on a presented word 
and blue means to perform a semantic task on a presented word), and in the 
shape training session, participants responded according to the shape dimension 
of the cue (e.g. triangle means to perform a semantic task, and circle means to 
perform a phonological task on a presented word).  The task cue meaning and 
the rule assignment for both training sessions, as well as the order of the training 
presented were counterbalanced across participants.  The task cues and 
associated rules are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 The target word stimuli were nouns with written frequency over 15, taken 
from the Medical Research Council Psycholinguistic Database 
(http://websites.psychology.uwa.edu.au/school/MRCDatabase/uwa_mrc.htm).  
Half of the words had two syllables and the other half had one or three syllables; 
half had abstract meaning with a concreteness rating below 300 and the other 
half had concrete meaning with a concreteness rating above 500. Different word 
stimuli were used in the pre-task training than in the main task. 
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Figure 4.1. Schematic drawing of task cues and their associated task rules.  
Each task cue has two dimensions: color and shape. For a given cue, each 
dimension could either associated with the same task rule (congruent cues) or 
with different task rules (incongruent cues). During the test phase, the relevant 
cue dimension remained constant within a block and alternated across blocks. 
 
Procedure 
 Participants either performed a phonological task or a semantic task for a 
visually presented word.  The phonological task required the participants to 
indicate by pressing one of two buttons whether the presented word contained 
two syllables or not. The semantic task required the participants to indicate 
whether the meaning of the word referred to an abstract concept or a concrete 
object. 
 An example trial was illustrated in Figure 4.2.  For each trial, the sequence 
began with a 300-ms task cue indicating the upcoming task, followed by a 300 
ms delay.  A target word then appeared and remained on screen until a response 
was made.  After each response, feedback was presented for 300 ms to indicate 
whether the response was “Correct”, “Incorrect” or “Too slow”.  The next trial then 
began after a fixed interval of 3000 ms.  
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Figure 4.2. Example trial event progression 
 
 Participants were instructed to perform tasks according to the relevant cue 
dimension (color or shape).  For each training session, the relevant dimension 
remained constant throughout the entire session.   To ensure both feature 
dimensions of the cue were strongly associated with their corresponding tasks, 
participants performed 320 trials over a course of 30 minutes on each cue 
dimension (an hour in total for both the color and shape training sessions) in a 
quiet laboratory room. 
 For the test phase, participants performed two experiments, and each 
experiment consisted of two blocks of 64 trials.  In one experiment, the proportion 
of switch versus repeat trials was manipulated; and in the other experiment, the 
proportion of incongruent versus congruent trials was manipulated.  In each 
experiment, there were two blocks of 64 trials.  One of the blocks had a high 
proportion of conflict trials and the other one had a low proportion of conflict 
trials.  The order of the experiment and the order of the block presented were 
counterbalanced across participants.  The structure of the study is illustrated in 
Figure 4.3.  For each block, regardless of which conflict type was manipulated, 
participants were required to attend to the color or shape dimension of the cue 
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according to a 2-second instruction screen presented every 8 trials (“Attend 
Color” or “Attend Shape”) throughout the whole block.  The relevant dimension 
alternated across the whole block using a fixed ABAB order.  
   
Proportion conflict manipulation 
 The proportion conflict manipulation for both types of conflict was done 
implicitly. Each participant performed two experiments of which one of the conflict 
types was manipulated. 
(1). In the experiment where task-switching was manipulated, the relative 
proportion of switch versus repeat trials within a block was 75% switch trials and 
25% repeat trials for high proportion switch block.  Conversely, in the low 
proportion switch block, the opposite proportion was used (25% switch and 75% 
repeat trials).  In addition, in both the high proportion and low proportion switch 
blocks, the relative proportion of congruent cue versus incongruent cue trials was 
kept at 50%. 
(2). In the experiment where cue-incongruence was manipulated, the 
relative proportions of incongruent cue versus congruent cue trials within a block 
was 75% incongruent and 25% congruent for high proportion incongruence block 
and opposite proportion was used for the low proportion incongruence block.  
Also, the relative proportion of switch versus repeat trials for both blocks was 
kept at 50%.  That is, in each experiment, we only manipulated one type of 
conflict while keeping the other conflict constant.   
 
Figure 4.3.  An example of the experimental structure.  Each participant 
performed two experiments. In each experiment a different conflict type was 
manipulated.  Each experiment had two blocks of 64 trials in which the proportion 
of conflict trials was manipulated.  
 
Data Analysis 
 In order to examine whether the proportion manipulation influenced the 
costs associated with task switching and cue incongruence, we conducted two 
independent sets of analyses of variance (ANOVAs), one for each experiment. 
Each set of ANOVAs had a factorial design of Conflict proportion (high conflict; 
low conflict) x Cue incongruence (incongruent; congruent) x Task switching 
(switch; repeat). RT data and error rates data were analyzed separately.  
Geisser-Greehouse corrected p values was reported. The first 16 trials of each 
block were removed, because it is assumed that the control is implemented only 
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after the participants experienced the level of conflict on the first few trials in a 
block.  The first trial after a change in the color/shape dimension could not be 
classified as either a switch or repeat trial and so these trials were not included in 
any of the analyses. Trials with error were also removed.  Descriptive statistics 




In the experiment where the proportion of task-switching was manipulated, the 
ANOVA on RT revealed a significant main effect of task switching (F (1,22) = 
10.756, p = 0.003) such that participants were slower in task-switch trials (933 
ms) compared to task-repeat trials (882 ms), thus indicating a significant task-
switching cost.  However, there was no significant interaction between Conflict 
proportion and Task switching F (1,22) = 2.437, p = 0.133, nor between Conflict 
proportion and Cue incongruence F (1,22) = 3.208, p = 0.087, thus indicating that 
the switching cost was unaffected by the proportion of trials in the block that were 
switch trials. The proportion of switch trials also did not modulate the size of the 
effect of the other conflict type, i.e. incongruence costs.  These findings are 
illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
 For the error rates analysis, the ANOVA revealed marginally significant 
main effects of task switching (F (1,22) = 3.607, p = 0.071) and cue incongruence 
(F (1,22) = 4.162, p =0.054).  There were no significant interactions. 
	   102	  
 In the experiment where the proportion of cue-incongruence was 
manipulated, the ANOVA on RT revealed a significant main effect of task 
switching (F (1,22) = 20.532, p < 0.001).  However, the main effect of cue 
incongruence was not significant (F (1,22) = 1.953, p =0.176).  This would not be 
surprising if the size of incongruence costs in the high proportion congruent block 
were small, rendering the main effect (considering the incongruent effects from 
both high and low proportion congruent blocks) insignificant.  Indeed, we found a 
significant interaction between block proportion congruence and the congruence 
of the trial (F (1,22) = 4.30, p = 0.05.  Therefore, we conducted two post-hoc 
contrasts, one on high proportion incongruent block, and the other one on low 
proportion incongruent block.  As expected, these follow-up analyses revealed 
that a significant cue-incongruence effect (incongruent trials = 983 ms; congruent 
trials = 926 ms) was present when proportion congruent was low (F (1,22) = 
5.021, p = 0.035), but not (incongruent trials = 943 ms; congruent trials = 946 ms) 
when the incongruent proportion was high (F (1,22) = 0.019, p = 0.892).  Finally, 
there was no significant interaction between the cue congruence proportion and 
task-switching (F (1,22) = 0.001, p = 0.978).  Taken together, the significant 
interaction between block congruence proportion and trial cue-incongruence, and 
the lack of interaction between block congruence proportion and Task-switching 
suggest that cue-incongruence effect was susceptible to the proportion 
congruence manipulation, and this modulatory effect did not transfer to the other 
conflict type, thus indicating a conflict-specific cognitive control mechanism.  The 
findings are illustrated in Figure 4.5.     
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 For the error rates analysis, the ANOVA revealed significant main effects 
of cue-incongruence (F (1,22) = 10.465, p =0.004) and proportion congruence (F 
(1,22) = 6.79, p =0.016).  There were no significant interaction effects. 
 




	  	   Task	  switching	   Cue	  incongruence	  
	  	   High	   Low	   High	   Low	  
Switch	   0.924	   0.942	   0.983	   0.992	  
Repeat	   0.896	   0.869	   0.907	   0.917	  
Incongruent	   0.922	   0.892	   0.943	   0.983	  
Congruent	   0.897	   0.919	   0.946	   0.926	  





	  	   Task	  switching	   Cue	  incongruence	  
	  	   High	   Low	   High	   Low	  
Switch	   0.075	   0.054	   0.082	   0.083	  
Repeat	   0.075	   0.045	   0.040	   0.091	  
Incongruent	   0.090	   0.063	   0.071	   0.108	  
Congruent	   0.061	   0.035	   0.051	   0.065	  












Figure 4.4. The effect of proportion switch manipulation on switch costs and 
incongruence costs. The low proportion switch block (“Low”) indicates 25% 
switch trials and 75% repeat trials, 50% congruent trials and 50% incongruent 
trials.  The high proportion switch block (“High”) indicates 75% switch trials and 
25% repeat trials, 50% congruent trials and 50% incongruent trials.  Error bars 
represent the SEM.   (A).  Mean reaction time according to the effect of 
proportion (high/low) on task-switching (task switch/task repeat). (B). Mean 
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Figure 4.5.  The effect of proportion incongruent manipulation on switch costs 
and incongruence costs.  The low proportion congruent condition (“Low”) 
indicates 25% incongruent trials and 75% congruent trials, 50% switch trials 
and 50% repeat trials.  The high proportion congruent condition (“High”) 
indicates 75% incongruent trials and 25% congruent trials, 50% switch trials 
and 50% repeat trials.   Error bars represent SEM.   (A).  Mean reaction time 
according to the proportion congruent (high/low) and trial congruency. (B). Mean 
reaction time according to proportion congruent (high/low) and whether the trial 
was a task switch or a repeat.  The asterisk denotes statistical significance 




The current experiment is, to our knowledge, the first to demonstrate dissociable 
effects of a cognitive control modulation on different types of task conflict, namely 
the task-switching conflict and cue-incongruence conflict.  One novelty of the 
current experiment was the use of a new paradigm that directly introduces 
different degrees of conflict at the task level, independent of particular stimuli or 
specific motor responses involved in the task.  We found proportion-conflict 
effects could be observed in the situation where the proportion of cue 
incongruence was manipulated.  Higher proportion of incongruent trials resulted 
in a smaller incongruence cost, as compared to low proportion of incongruent 
trials.  In addition, the proportion congruent effects did not transfer to the other 
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conflict type.  That is, the task switch costs remains virtually the same regardless 
the proportions of incongruent trials within a block.  The pattern of results 
provides evidence for a conflict-specific account of cognitive control with respect 
to cue-incongruence conflict. In addition, task-switching costs were also 
unaffected by the proportion of switch trials in a block.  The fact that task-
switching conflict resolution and cue-incongruence conflict resolution were 
modulated differently by the proportion manipulation suggests a distinction 
between them.  It appears that both types of conflict caused interference to the 
cognitive system, as evident by high conflict trial types (i.e. task-switching trial 
and task-incongruent trials) being associated with significant costs in terms of 
task performance.  However, only cue-incongruence conflict appeared to be 
modulated by a proactive conflict monitoring system.  Taken together, our 
conclusion is consistent with the idea that there are distinct cognitive control 
mechanisms for resolving different types of task conflict, namely the switching-
induced and incongruence-induced task conflict, because they respond 
differently to the proportion manipulation. The cognitive control mechanism for 
resolving cue-incongruence appears to be conflict-specific, such that resolution 
of cue-incongruence conflict did not result in facilitation or impairment of conflict 
resolution for task-switching conflict. 
 At the first glance, the finding that task-switching costs were unaffected by 
the proportion congruence effects seems at odds with previous literature, which 
showed task-switch costs are larger for high proportion task-repeat than for low 
proportion of task-repeat blocks of trials (e.g. Dreisbach et al., 2002; Dreisbach 
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and Haider, 2006; Schneider and Logan, 2006).  However, one can speculate 
that the discrepancy of results might be explained by the task paradigm that we 
used. Specifically, these studies aforementioned used a task-switching paradigm 
in which the tasks involve either performing parity or magnitude judgments on 
digits (1 to 9, except 5).  One recurring issue with this paradigm is that task 
conflict, which by definition is caused by frequent changes of task identity, is 
often confounded with response conflict, which occurs when the correct response 
for a given target is either different (incongruent response) or the same 
(congruent response) according to the task rule.  On the other hand, in our 
paradigm, we use trial-unique targets (i.e. each word was only used once in the 
entire experiment), thus obviating the possibility of participants forming 
associations between the target words and a response.  In fact, in a separate 
analysis, we found no significant difference in reaction time between the 
response-congruent trials and response-incongruent trials (analysis is not shown 
here).  Therefore, it is likely that in the previous studies, the proportion switching 
effects are indirectly modulating the task-switch costs through reducing response 
conflict on repeat trials rather than by facilitating task-switching.  
 One question raised by the current study is how conflict proportion within a 
block influences the cost associated with resolving cue-incongruence conflict.  
According to the early accounts, proportion congruent effects can be explained 
by the adoption of a sustained or proactive control strategy or task set, which 
prepares the attentional system to handle interference from the upcoming 
distracting feature of the incongruent cue.  For example, Logan and Zbrodoff 
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(1979) proposed that participants develop expectancies about the proportion of 
conflict trials and voluntarily shift their attentional strategy according to the 
conflict levels.  That is, when the proportion of incongruent trials is low, 
participants detect that conflict is infrequent and thus allow their attention to be 
drawn to the more salient information, because the salient information frequently 
corresponds to the correct response.  Such strategy would speed up processing 
of congruent trials (the task-irrelevant information has a facilitating effect), and 
slow down processing of incongruent trials (more interference from the irrelevant 
dimension).  On the other hand, when the proportion of incongruent trials is high, 
the best strategy is to inhibit attention to the irrelevant information.  Such strategy 
would slow down processing of congruent trials (lack of a facilitating effect) and 
speed up incongruent trials (better attentional filtering of the irrelevant 
information), and thus generate smaller interference effects.  In relation to our 
experiment, proportion congruent manipulations may influence how strongly 
contextual information is maintained.  In our task, the cues that indicate the 
upcoming task had a relevant and an irrelevant dimension, and they could either 
indicate the same task rule (congruent trial) or different task rules (incongruent 
trial).  Since the relevant dimension alternated within a block (every 8 trials in a 
block of 64 trials), participants were required to maintain the currently relevant 
context (“attend color” or “attend shape”) in working memory.  Thus, when the 
proportion of incongruent trials was low (mostly congruent trials), participants 
may have resorted to a reflexive or stimulus/cue-driven control strategy, because 
the congruent cues were usually associated with the same task, regardless of the 
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current context (“attend color” or “attend shape”). When an infrequent 
incongruent cue appeared, participants were less prepared to select the relevant 
dimension of the cue; hence the lengthened reaction time for the incongruent 
trials and greater incongruence costs.  On the other hand, when the proportion of 
incongruent trials was high (mostly incongruent trials), participants may have 
adopted a strategy of maintaining a strong and sustained representation of the 
currently relevant context.  Therefore, the reaction time for processing 
incongruent cues is reduced due to better attentional focus on the relevant 
dimension of the cue, whereas the reaction time for processing congruent cues is 
lengthened because there is less of a facilitating effect from the irrelevant but 
congruent information. 
 In conclusion, the current study extends the existing literature by showing 
that proportion of high or low conflict trials that are in a block can affect conflict 
resolution involving abstract task rules, independently from stimulus-stimulus 
conflict or stimulus-response conflict.  Furthermore, our data also suggests there 
are distinct cognitive control mechanisms for resolving different types of task 
conflict, namely the switching-induced and incongruence-induced task conflict, 
because they respond differently to the proportion manipulation. Finally, the 
cognitive control system for resolving cue-incongruence conflict operates in a 
conflict-specific manner, supporting the conflict-specific account of cognitive 
control. These results not only show evidence supporting distinct cognitive 
control mechanisms for resolving different task conflict types, but also challenge 
the conflict-monitoring theory, which claims that the conflict-control loop is only 
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sensitive to the general level of conflict within the system, regardless of the 
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5. Chapter 5: General Conclusions 
 
5.1. Findings of this dissertation 
 
Establishing how abstract rule-like information is controlled and selected for 
further processing is essential to our understanding of higher cognitive functions.  
This dissertation sought to investigate the conflict-driven cognitive control 
mechanisms in humans for resolving conflict among abstract representations of 
non-sensory information. The overarching aim was addressed using 
neuroimaging techniques and behavioral manipulations.  The first study 
investigated the cognitive control mechanisms for resolving conflict among 
abstract rules.  The second study sought to examine whether different types of 
rule-related conflict, namely task-switching and cue-incongruence, recruited 
similar or dissociable neural systems.  Finally, the third study investigated 
whether qualitatively distinct cognitive control mechanisms were involved in 
resolving conflict associated with task-switching and cue-incongruence.   
 In Chapter II (Experiment 1), the primary goal was to test whether the 
cognitive control mechanisms involved in resolving conflict among abstract 
representations were similar to those involved in resolving sensory 
representations.  A new paradigm was developed in which participants were 
trained to associate the color and shape dimensions of the cue with either the 
same rule (congruent cues) or different ones (incongruent cues).  This enabled 
us to manipulate the degree of conflict at the task-rule level, independently of the 
sensory features of the task cues or any motor responses triggered by the 
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targets that the rule applied to.  In addition, semantic and phonological tasks 
were chosen because (1) they are abstract rules that are not tied to specific 
stimulus-response associations or any sensory features; and (2) previous studies 
have shown that they preferentially activate distinctive brain regions.  These 
properties allow us to use the activity in these task-selective areas as a proxy for 
measuring the degree to which the conflict between relevant versus irrelevant 
rule representations was resolved. This study demonstrated that incongruent 
cues are associated with a greater behavioral cost compared to congruent cues, 
and this behavioral effect was accompanied by increased activity in several brain 
areas, including inferior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, subcortical areas, 
and insula.  Importantly, the conflict between abstract representations of task 
rules was resolved by feedback from the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) 
enhancing the activity of the brain region processing the relevant abstract 
information, rather than suppressing the activity of the brain region processing 
the irrelevant abstract information.  Multivoxel pattern classification analysis 
further revealed the representational content within the rIFG contains both 
contextual and rule information, suggesting rIFG biases selection of the 
appropriate abstract task representations according to both the cue and the more 
temporally extended context. 
 In Chapter 3 (Experiment 2), the same data set from Experiment 1 was 
used to answer a different research question. The goal is to examine the 
generality of cognitive control for abstract representations by asking whether 
different sources of conflict pertaining to task rules recruited a single cognitive 
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control neural system or dissociable cognitive control neural systems.  Cued 
task-switching and incongruence tasks are two commonly used paradigms to 
study the mechanisms of cognitive control concerning task rules.  Despite the 
presence of conflict between a relevant and an irrelevant task rule in both 
paradigms, the sources of conflict originate differently.  In this experiment, we 
take advantage of the task design in Experiment 1, in which the task-switching 
conflict and cue-incongruence conflict were factorially combined, to answer the 
generality question of cognitive control.  The fMRI results from this study show 
that switching-induced and incongruency-induced conflict recruit distinct brain 
networks, which indicates that independent conflict-driven cognitive control loops 
are involved to resolve different types of task-rule conflict.  Findings also suggest 
that task switching and cue incongruence activate left-lateralized and right-
lateralized frontoparietal networks, respectively. This lateralization may reflect 
different cognitive control processes needed for successfully resolving 
incongruency-induced and switching-induced conflict, as previous studies have 
shown that a sustained, block-wise, cognitive control component activates right-
lateralized frontoparietal brain regions, while a transient, trial-by-trial, cognitive 
control component activates left-lateralized frontoparietal brain areas.  This offers 
further evidence that task-switching and cue-incongruence are processed as 
different types of conflict and may require qualitatively different control modes to 
resolve each of them independently. 
 Finally, in Chapter 4 (Experiment 3), we continued the same line of 
research as in Chapter 3 (Experiment 2) and asked whether the conflict-driven 
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cognitive control mechanisms responsible for resolving task-switching and cue-
incongruence conflict are similar or qualitatively different.  This was investigated 
by employing a behavioral proportion manipulation (changing the frequency of 
conflict trials within a single block).  We found proportion conflict effect (greater 
behavioral cost for low proportion of conflict trials compared to high proportion of 
conflict trials) only when the ratio of incongruent cue versus congruent cues was 
manipulated, but not when the ratio of switch versus repeat trials was 
manipulated.  In addition, regardless of which type of the conflict was 
manipulated, control recruited by one type of conflict did not result in resolution of 
the other type. Thus, the fact that the same proportion-of-conflict manipulation 
produces different conflict resolution effects suggests qualitatively distinct 
cognitive control mechanisms are at work in order to resolve these two types of 
rule-related conflict.   
 Taken together, by using a novel paradigm that directly manipulates the 
degree of conflict at the task-rule level, our studies provide better understanding 
of the mechanism by which conflict among abstract representations of rule 
information may be resolved.  This conflict-driven control mechanism resolves 
conflict among abstract representations of task rules by selectively enhancing 
activity in areas processing the relevant abstract information (Experiment 1).  
This is in agreement with previous selective attention studies that showed 
competing sensory stimuli were resolved through enhancement of brain area 
coding the relevant sensory information (e.g. Egner and Hirsch, 2005).  In 
addition, the conflict-driven control mechanisms for task rules operate in a 
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conflict-specific manner.  Rather than monitoring the general level of conflict in 
the system, the conflict-driven cognitive control mechanisms are sensitive to the 
source of these rule conflicts and how they are generated (Experiment 2-3).  
Overall, our studies provided invaluable insight regarding the cognitive control 
mechanisms for abstract rule information.  Given that many higher cognitive 
functions, such as planning, reasoning, problem solving, highly rely on the ability 
to represent and select appropriate rules, our studies made it more tractable to 
understand how these higher cognitive functions are achieved.  In the section 
that follows, I consider the theoretical implications of our findings, with reference 
to Miller and Cohen’s Integrative Theory of Cognitive Control (Section 5.2), 
followed by open questions generated by the current dissertation (Section 5.3), 
and a final reflection on the findings of this dissertation (Section 5.4). 
 
5.2.  Examining the Implications for Theory of Cognitive Control  
 
 Miller and Cohen (2001) integrative theory of PFC function is one of the 
most influential models of cognitive control.  The model states that the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) exerts control over other brain areas by representing and 
maintaining goals or task rule information. Specifically, the rule representations in 
the PFC are like “maps”, which configure the neural pathways within and 
between other brain areas that are needed to perform the task.  They draw 
explicitly upon Desimone and Duncan (1995) biased competition theory of visual 
attention, in which attention was conceptualized as a biasing signal that 
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modulates the mutually inhibitory interactions among populations of neurons. The 
increased activity of neurons representing the attended stimulus, by virtue of 
mutual inhibition, results in the suppression of other neurons representing the 
irrelevant stimuli.  According to Miller and Cohen, this mechanism of biased 
competition not only occurs between the PFC and visual cortex, but also with 
other sensory modalities, as well as systems responsible for movement 
execution, memory retrieval, and emotion evaluation.  Therefore, they proposed 
that biased competition serves as a fundamental mechanism by which PFC 
exerts control over other brain systems to produce goal-directed behavior.   
 While Miller and Cohen proposed that the PFC biases neural processing 
in the rest of the brain by representing and maintaining a particular type of 
information: the rules of a task, it is unclear whether such process of biased 
competition also occurs within the PFC itself when there is a competition 
between abstract representations of task rules.  In Section 1.3.1, I reviewed 
human neuroimaging and monkey neurophysiological studies that showed 
populations of neurons in PFC can represent abstract rule information that is 
independent from the sensory properties of the cue and anticipated motor 
responses.  However, none of the previous studies have examined the cognitive 
control mechanisms for selecting the relevant rule over the irrelevant ones to 
guide behavior, particularly when the task demands are frequently changing 
which places greater emphasis on the control process to select the appropriate 
rule to meet the current task demand.  Experiment 1 addressed this question by 
showing that when there is a competition between abstract rules, the conflict was 
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resolved by right inferior frontal gyrus providing the bias signals to select the 
relevant rule information, rather than suppressing the irrelevant rule information.  
Such pattern of results were exemplified by the greater rIFG involvement during 
the incongruent trials predicts the greater enhancement of activity in the brain 
areas processing the relevant abstract information associated with the task rule.  
Therefore, our findings have important implications for Miller and Cohen’s 
cognitive control theory, suggesting that abstract rule information should be 
treated as a type of information, which is itself subjected to the principles of 
biased competition.   
 Our results are also different from what the biased competition model 
would predict in the sense that we did not find any direct competition or inhibition 
of the irrelevant abstract information.  It is important to note, however, that the 
inhibition is a result of selective attention via the local mutually inhibitory 
interactions within the receptive fields of the same neurons.  Such inhibitory 
mechanism may be difficult to observe between separate cortical areas because 
they are not likely to share strong inhibitory connections with each other.  Thus, 
the enhancement of neural activity in one area would not necessarily be 
expected to result in inhibition of the other.  Furthermore, previous studies have 
highlighted the difficulties in using fMRI to investigate inhibition in posterior 
cortical regions (for a review, see Aron, 2007).  One problem is the fMRI signals 
may not capture the neural inhibition effect despite another method can clearly 
demonstrate GABA-mediated neural inhibition (Waldvogel et al., 2000).  Another 
problem is that the definition of inhibition using fMRI measure is the relative 
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difference between task condition and baseline.  Therefore, if the baseline 
activity in an area has higher activity during rest, then the contrast would show up 
as deactivation, which makes it difficult to interpret such result as inhibition at the 
neural level (Stark and Squire, 2001).  
 Overall, we extended the notion of biased competition, at least in the case 
of enhancing relevant information, to processes within the PFC and proposed 
that PFC is the source of the bias signals representing task rules as well as the 
target of that signals when competition between task rules occurs. 
 
5.3. Open Questions 
 
The work presented in this dissertation provides new insights regarding how 
conflict-driven cognitive control mechanism resolves conflict among abstract 
representations of rule information.  These findings also open up a rich set of 
questions for future investigation on how other domains of cognitive control are 
implemented when the information involves abstract rules. 
 
Conflict Resolution versus Integration 
 
PFC has been implicated in other control processes that appear to extend 
beyond simply resolving conflict between competing representations. For 
example, PFC has shown to be sensitive to conditions that require subgoaling 
and/or integration across representations (Koechlin et al., 1999).  Braver and 
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Bongiolatti (2002) used fMRI to test whether the frontopolar region of prefrontal 
cortex is involved in integration of two sources of information for target 
determination.  They asked participants to monitor for the presence of any 
concrete probe word immediately following any abstract cue word, which would 
require the participants to first perform a semantic classification and then relate 
the subsequent categorization result to the semantic status of the next word in 
sequence (i.e., participants required to integrate two sources of information to 
make a correct response).  The results demonstrated that lateral frontopolar 
cortex subserves higher-order control processes such as subgoaling and 
integration.   Thus, another important question to address here is how other 
cognitive control processes, such as subgoaling/integration, are implemented 
when the information involves abstract rules.  Experiment 1 showed that when 
there is a conflict between task rules, the conflict was resolved by right inferior 
frontal gyrus enhancing the relevant abstract representation pertaining to the 
relevant task rule.  Since integration/subgoaling and conflict resolution are two 
very different cognitive control processes, their underlying neural mechanisms 
may be qualitatively different from each other.  It will be interesting to test how 
prefrontal cortex interacts with task-selective areas when the task demand 
requires integration of task rules, rather than selection of the relevant task rule 
over the irrelevant ones.  Studying how other cognitive control processes are 
implemented when the information involves abstract rule representations would 
help us better understand how other higher-order cognitive functions such as 
planning, problem solving and reasoning are achieved.   
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Enhancement versus suppression  
 
Top-down cognitive control can be achieved by enhancing the relevant 
information, suppressing the irrelevant information, or both (Cohen et al., 1990).  
Experiment 1 demonstrated that conflict resolution between task rules was 
resolved by right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) selectively enhancing the brain area 
processing the relevant abstract information pertaining to the relevant rule, rather 
than by suppressing the brain area processing the irrelevant abstract information 
pertaining to the irrelevant rule.  However, suppression of irrelevant task 
information may still be a plausible mechanism that solves conflict between task 
rules when the task demand favors suppression.  For example, a study by Yeung 
and colleagues (2006) investigated the cognitive control mechanism of between-
task competition using task switching paradigm.  On each trial, they showed 
participants overlapping face and word stimuli, and the participants were required 
to either classify the gender of the face (face task) or the word as having two 
syllables or not (word task), depending on a task cue presented at the beginning 
of each miniblock.  Across miniblocks, the participants either had to switch to a 
different task or repeat the same task.  They found that regions selective for the 
irrelevant task showed increased activity during switch and that the switch costs 
correlated with the activity in the task-irrelevant area, rather than the activity in 
the task-relevant area.  The observed pattern of results suggests that 
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interference from recently performed task significantly contributes to the 
behavioral switching costs.   
 In Experiment 1 and 2, to solve the cue incongruence, it requires active 
maintenance of contextual information (shape or color) to proactively prevent the 
activation of irrelevant rule representations.  In contrast, when little time is 
available for preparation as in the case of task switching, the cognitive control 
mechanisms may operate differently.  Experiment 2 and 3 have shown that 
conflicts arising from task-switching and cue-incongruence recruit anatomically 
distinct neural circuits and that their underlying cognitive control mechanisms are 
qualitatively different.  Thus, it would be interesting to use the current paradigm 
to investigate how PFC interacts with task-selective areas during task switching.  
Based on Yeung et al.’s result (2006), one hypothesis would be that PFC 
resolves task-switching conflict by suppressing the activity in the task-irrelevant 
area.  Future research would need to confirm that. 
 
Cognitive flexibility and cognitive stability 
 
Experiments 2 and 3 showed that conflict induced by task-switching and cue-
incongruence were resolved by qualitatively different cognitive control 
mechanisms and they recruited anatomically distinct neural circuits.  Particularly, 
when correlating switch costs with incongruence costs across individuals, there is 
no correlation between the two.  Upon reflection, the best strategy to resolve cue-
incongruence conflict was to maintain a clear and focused representation of the 
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current contextual information (“Attend Color” or “Attend Shape”) in working 
memory to guide the selection of the relevant task rule associated with the 
context in effect.  On the contrary, the best strategy to resolve task-switching 
conflict was to flexibly and quickly switch to the currently relevant task rule and 
disengage the irrelevant one, on a trial-by-trial basis.  Thus, despite the task 
requirements being the same: selecting the relevant task rule over the irrelevant 
one, the exact cognitive control requirements are different: one requires cognitive 
stability (i.e. our ability to adhere to behavioral goals in the face of interference) 
and the other one requires cognitive flexibility (i.e. our ability to flexibly adjust 
behavior according to the change of environmental demands).   
 Using fMRI in healthy humans, Armbruster et al. (2012) showed individual 
differences among participants such that those who spontaneously switch more 
frequently are more distractible as measured by the number of errors they make 
in the presence of a distractor.  Moreover, more flexible persons (those who are 
more ready to switch spontaneously under the ambiguous condition) activated 
the left-lateralized task-switching areas (inferior frontal junction [IFJ], basal 
ganglia) less than inflexible people during task switching. Most importantly, the 
functional coupling between IFJ and superior frontal gyrus (SFG) is task 
dependent: their activities were positively correlated with the spontaneous 
switching rate during distractor inhibition and negatively correlated with the 
spontaneous switching rate during task switching.  Thus, high connectivity 
between these two areas appears to be necessary for suppressing the 
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distractors and decreased connectivity appears to be necessary for successful 
task switching. 
 It will be interesting to relate the current findings (i.e. no correlation 
between switch costs and incongruence costs across participants) to individual 
differences in cognitive flexibility and cognitive stability.  By examining whether 
switch costs and incongruence costs associated with differences in activation or 
functional connectivity between brain areas, we can explore the individual 
differences in cognitive flexibility versus stability and its underlying neural basis. 
 
5.4. Final reflection 
 
This dissertation was conceived upon the observation that previous theories of 
conflict-driven cognitive control have been largely focused on the control over 
perceptual representations of stimuli that are transiently present in our 
environment or control over motor responses. There are a few studies that have 
examined how selection of abstract conceptual representations is accomplished 
by manipulating competition between lexical representations during word 
production (Robinson et al., 1998) between phonological representations using a 
stem completion task (Desmond et al., 1998), or between semantic 
representations using semantic priming paradigm (Metzler, 2001). The 
competition between abstract rule representations has not been fully examined, 
however, until now. When I began graduate studies, a group of researchers had 
demonstrated that rules could be actively maintained as a type of information in 
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working memory to guide behavior, and that prefrontal cortex neurons can 
encode/represent abstract rule information.  In our daily lives, we use a variety of 
abstract rules (e.g. social rules) and constantly shift them to meet the 
environmental demands. That initiated my interest in examining the control 
mechanisms that govern abstract rule information.  
 Most studies on the cognitive control of task rules employ a task-switching 
paradigm or an incongruence paradigm.  However, one issue that became 
increasingly problematic was that it was difficult to dissociate rule representations 
from the sensory cue that signifies the rule or the anticipated response 
association that was tied to the stimulus.  Therefore, I began my challenging task 
of designing a parsimonious paradigm that could independently manipulate the 
degree of conflict directly at the task-rule level.  Moreover, the special choice of 
semantic and phonological tasks allows me to measure how much of the 
competition between the relevant and the irrelevant rule was resolved.  
 Taken together, the studies that I presented in this dissertation 
demonstrated a mechanistic view of how conflict among abstract rule 
representations is resolved and offered a conflict-specific account of the cognitive 
control mechanism for dealing with different sources of rule conflict.  These 
results extend Miller and Cohen’s (2001) cognitive control model by suggesting a 
similar biased-competition-like process that occurs between PFC and posterior 
areas also occurs within the PFC itself. The process is somewhat different, 
however, in that the selection of relevant rule over the irrelevant ones is achieved 
solely by enhancing the relevant rule representation, which is reflected by the 
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correlation between rIFG activity and the degree to which the task-relevant 
information is enhanced, and not by inhibiting the irrelevant information. By 
studying the cognitive control mechanism of task rules in various cognitive 
domains (conflict resolution, integration, inhibition), understanding of higher-
ordered functions such as planning, reasoning, and problem-solving may 
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